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DO INVESTORS OVER-REACT TO PATTERNS OF PAST
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE MEASURES?

ABSTRACT

The objectives of this thesis are threefold. First, this dissertation examines
whether patterns (growth and consistency in growth) of firms' past financial performance
influence investors' perceptions about stock values and future performance of these
firms. Second, multiple estimation horizons of past performance variables (ranging from
one to five years) are used to assess whether the interaction between growth patterns and
measurement interval lengths of these variables influence investor expectations. Third,
this thesis examines whether an intermediate price drifts (e.g. Jegadeesh and Titman
[1993]) and subsequent long-horizon price reversal (e.g. DeBondt and Thaler (1985)l are
manifestations of a market over-reaction as suggested in recent studies (e.g. Lee and
Swaminathail [2000]).
Annual data on sales, earnings, cash flow, and stock returns over various time
periods from a sample of publicly traded firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX, and
NASDAQ exchanges from 1983 to 1999 are used to address the research questions
proposed in this thesis. The evidence provided in this study shows that low-growth firms
outperform their high-growth firm counterparts across different performance variables,
estimation intervals, and investment horizons except in the first post-formation year for
firms ranked by their prior one-year financial growth rate (except for sales growth).
These return differentials between low and high growth firms increase uniformly as more
years of past financial performance added.
Furthermore, when ranking firms based on the consistency of their prior financial
growth rates over multiple estimation periods, this study finds that a firm consistently
achieving low (high) growth rates that places it in the lowest (highest) growth 40 percent
earns high (low) stock returns. The consistency in a firm's prior financial performance
influences the behavior of its future stock returns, i.e. the longer the consistency of
exceptionally strong (weak) performance of a firm, the greater (lower) its subsequent
stock returns. However, the incremental impact of an additional year of growth
consistency on future returns seems to dissipate after the third year of prior performance
data, suggesting that it may not take investors longer than three years to assume that a
firm's past growth will continue for many years to come. Thus, additional evidence
confirming investors' prior beliefs will not lead to a significant price drift because their
expectations are already reflected in market prices.
First year returns for firms except SG exhibit a strong financial drift. The price
drift seems to persist even with longer estimation horizons. Multiple regression analyses
suggest that reported higher returns for low-growth firms is not due to risk as measured
by market betas or book-to-market ratios, nor is it due to the disproportioiiate impact
caused by relatively smaller firms. As well, the one-year-ahead size-adjusted abnormal

vii

returns are significantly and negatively related to the size-adjusted abnormal returns for
years 2 through 5. This result indicates that the evidence of a price drift reported in the
first post-formation year might be due to a market over-reaction, a finding consistent with
results reported by Lee and Swaminathan (2000). In additional analysis, return
performance for all growth portfolios for the month of January is compared to the
remainder of the year. No evidence indicating that returns to these portfolios are driven
by extraordinary performance of low-growth firms in the month of January.
For all variables (except for past sales growth and to some degree past stock
returns), the financial drift in year one return for portfolios based on prior-one year of
past performance data, is significantly stronger than that reported in Chan et al. (2004).
Results reported in this thesis indicate that the average abnormal return differential
between low and high growth firms for the five-year estimation intervals (with exception
of past sales growth) is greater than1 0 percentage points. The evidence contradicts that
documented in Chan et al. (2004). They find no discernable evidence of price reversals
over the next 36-months after ranking firms by their five-year growth rates in sales,
operating income, and net income. However, results of this study are consistent with the
predictions of behavioral models (e.g. Daniel et al. [I9981 and Lakonishok et al. [1994])
suggesting that investors put excessive weight on patterns of a firm's past financial
performance when projecting its future prospects.

viii

Biography

Abdulaziz M. Alwathainani was born on December 6, 1969, in Taif, Saudi Arabia. He is
a Saudi citizen. He graduated from al-Faisal High School in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia in
1989. He received his Bachelor Degree in Accounting from King Saud University in
Riyadh in 1994. He taught at the Institute of Public Administration (IPA) in Riyadh for
one year. He received a Master Degree in Accountancy with a Banking and Finance
concentration from Case Western Reserve University in Cleveland, Ohio in May 1999.
Subsequently, he taught at the IPA for two years before starting the Ph.D. Program in
Business with a concentration in Accounting at Virginia Commonwealth University,
Richmond, Virginia in August, 200 1. He is married to Hend and both are proud parents to
a beautiful-eight-year-old daughter, Raghad.

DO INVESTORS OVER-REACT TO PATTERNS OF PAST
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE MEASURES?

CHAPTER I
Introduction

1.1 Overview
The efficient markets hypothesis holds that stock market prices reflect their
fundamental values and that stock returns cannot be predicted from publicly available
information (e.g., Fama [1970, 199 11). It follows that markets incorporate new
information in asset prices in a timely fashion and without bias. Furthermore, even if
some market participants make errors, their mistakes are independent across individuals;
thus, these mistakes average out in market equilibrium (e.g., Fama [1965]).
However, Lee (2001, pg. 237) argues that "market efficiency is a journey, not a

destination," and the market price mechanism is a continuous process in which market
prices converge toward fundamental values through the interactions between quasirational traders (Lee refers to them as noise traders) and fully informed arbitrageurs.' He
argues that equating market prices with fundamental values is a nai've and conceptually
unsound assumption because it mischaracterizes the price discovery mechanism. In this
context. the salient features of capital market research that will have a significant impact

'

Imperfectly rational, quasi-rational, less rational, and boundedly rational are used interchangeably to
describe investors with limited information processing and problem solving ability that prevent them from
making perfectly rational decisions.

on the future will be: "(1) decision-driven, (2) interdisciplinary in nature and (3)
prospective in focus (Lee, 2001, pg. 247)."
Decision-driven research focuses on the behavior of decision-makers. How do
decision makers reach their decisions? What factors influence their decisions? How do
they use or misuse information signals? In capital market settings, accounting researchers
have a crucial role in addressing issues such as how investors make their investment
decisions and how accounting information influences their investment decision-making
processes (Lee, 2001).
Interdisciplinary research addresses the notion that accounting output is not the
sole determinant of economic decisions. To have a significant and enduring impact in
today's business environment, future capital market-based accounting research should be
interdisciplinary in nature (Lee, 2001). Thaler (1999) predicts that the future will focus
on the study of behavioral finance; Lee (2001) concurs that the trend is undoubtedly in
this direction. The demand of quasi-rational investors is an integrated part of market price
formation (e.g., Shiller [I9841 and Hirshleifer and Luo [2001]). Lee (2001) argues that to
affect market prices, the behavior of imperfectly rational investors must be systematic,
and the role of accounting researchers is to contribute to our understanding about factors
that give rise to these common investor sentiments and their impact on the market pricing
mechanism.
Prospective focus research is more concerned with the allocation of capital
resources in the economy through enhancing our understanding about future economic
decisions and factors that influence their outcomes (Lee, 2001). Traditionally, however,
capital market research in accounting tends to be historical in nature. This focus may

limit the contribution of accounting researchers in the area of understanding market
forces and their impact on the mechanism of market prices.
A growing body of literature on judgments and decision making processes

suggests that divergence from rationality is pervasive due to limitations of time,
information processing capacities, and other cognitive resource constraints (e.g.,
Hirshleifer [200 11, Mullainathan and Thaler [2000], Simon [1955], Trivers [1985, 199 11,
and Tversky and Kahneman [1974]). Tversky and Kahneman (1 974) argue that because
of these cognitive constraints, people tend to use representativeness heuristics to tackle
difficult and complex decision problems.2 They argue that individuals are inclined to
classify things into completely distinct and independent groups based on descriptive
characteristics and salient, attention-grabbing, and easy to recall clues that are more likely
to be given stronger emphasis. Chan, Frankel, and Kothari (2004) suggest that financial
performance metrics are both "salient" and readily "available" to the vast majority of
financial market participants.

1.2 The Objectives and Motivations of the Study
The objectives of this study are threefold. First, it examines whether patterns
(growth and consistency in growth) of past financial performance of a given firm or
group of firms influence the formation of investor perceptions about stock values and
future performance of these firms. Specifically, the present study investigates whether
growth and consistency in growth of historical financial performance of firms make it
more likely that investors form mistaken expectations about the future performance of
The term "representativeness heuristic" refers to a simplified "rule of thumb" developed to deal with
complex and difficult tasks.

these firms, driving market prices above (below) their fundamental values and, as a
result, subsequently earn low (high) returns. Second, using varying measurement
horizons of past performance variables, this study investigates whether the interaction
between patterns and measurement horizons of these variables affect investor
expectations. Finally, this thesis examines whether the documented momentum profits
and subsequent long-horizon price reversals are a manifestation of a market over-reaction
to patterns of past financial metricse3Specifically, using post-formation holding periods
of five years, the present study assesses whether ,the momentum gains over the twelve
months following the portfolio formation date are offset by long-term return reversals
over ,the remaining four-year holding period.
The body of literature over the last two decades indicates that the behavior of
future stock returns can be predicted from firms' past financial performance measures
such as changes in sales, earnings, cash flow, and stock returns. Specifically, researchers
have uncovered two market regularities: market momentum (under-reaction) and longrun price reversals (over-reaction). Market under-reaction is defined as positive
autocorrelations in stock returns over horizons ranging from three to twelve months.
Market over-reaction is defined as price reversals over the longer horizons of three to five
years. The under-reaction hypothesis suggests that investors are inclined to slowly
incorporate new fundamental signals into market prices, causing stock returns to drift in a
positive or negative direction as indicated by these signals over the short-term (e.g.,
Jegadeesh and Titman [I9931 and Bernard and Thomas [1989, 19901). On the other hand,
the over-reaction hypothesis posits that investors are likely to over-react to extreme past
3

In this thesis, long run, long-term, long period, and long horizon are used interchangeably and refer to a
period of time greater than twelve months but not more than five years.

financial performance, driving stock prices of firms with exceptionally high (low)
performance above (below) their fundamental values; as a result, these firms earn low
(high) returns in the long run (e.g., DeBondt and Thaler [1985, 19871, Lakonishok,
Shleifer, and Vishny [1994], and La Porta et al. [1997]).
Prior research examining market under- and over-reaction treats these two
phenomena as two distinct and independent phenomena. However, recent studies provide
mixed findings. Lee and Swaminathan (2000) and Jegadeesh and Titman (2001)
document market momentum over the ensuing twelve months following the portfolio
formation, but this momentum reverses over longer periods. These authors interpret their
evidence as suggesting a market over-reaction that recovers to fundamentals over the
long run. For example, Lee and Swaminathan (2000) examine the interaction between
past trading volume and past stock returns and its impact on the profitability of
momentum strategy. They maintain that the momentum profit reported by Jegadeesh and
Titman (1993) is offset by long-run return reversals. They argue that "this finding is
important because it refutes the common presumption that price momentum is simply a
market under-reaction. Instead, the evidence suggests that at least a portion of the initial
momentum gain is better characterized as an over-reaction (pg. 2,018)." On the other

hand, Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004) suggest that the link between market momentum
and long-run price reversals, if it exists, is weak because each phenomenon is driven by
different forces.
Whether the market under- and over-reaction evolve independently, as commonly
believed, or both are products of a market over-reaction that eventually reverts to
fundamental values, the extensive body of evidence documented in the literature suggests

there are systematic biases on the part of market participants that can be exploited for
generating trading profits without bearing extra risk. The notion that the behavior of stock
prices and returns can be predicted based on past performance measures does not square
with the standard market models. Fania (1998), however, argues that empirical evidence
of market under- and over-reaction is a question of chance that is anticipated by the
efficient market theory. He goes on to assert that most long-term evidence of stock return
predictability vanishes when firm size and book-to-market effects are included. Fama and
French (1996) suggest that the findings of DeBondt and Thaler (1 985) and Lakonishok et
al. (1994) are explained by multiple factor models. However, empirical studies that
examine whether portfolio returns based on fundamentallprice measures are attributable
to risk factors or market mispricing offer different interpretations after controlling for
potential risk exposures (e.g., Ali et al. [2003], Dichev [1998], La Porta, Lakonishok,
Shleifer, and Vishny [1997], and Piotroski [2000]). These studies find future returns
concentrate around subsequent earnings announcements. This evidence is interpreted as
consistent with market mispricing that subsequently corrects itself with the release of
earnings information.
With the growing body of evidence on the stock return predictability, behavioral
finance has emerged as a viable alternative to explain these market regularities. However,
before behavioral finance theorists offer a uniform theory that explains the behavior of
market prices and stock returns in terms of investor sentiment, behavioral theorists should
come to terms with the following issues. Do markets under-react or over-react to
information? Which incidents cause markets to under-react and which cause markets to
over-react? Are short-run market momentum and long-run price reversals different

phenomena or are they a manifestation of investor over-reactions to past financial
performance that subsequently recover to fundamentals over the longer horizons as
suggested by some recent findings (e.g., Lee and Swaminathan [2000])? What factors
lead investors to have biased expectations about future firm prospects?

1.3 Recent Theoretical Development

Recently, several theorists contribute to the development of psychology-based
theories that provide explanations to the documented market momentum effects and longhorizon price reversals based on investor behavior (e.g., Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny
[1998], Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam [1998], and Hoiig and Stein [1999]).
These theorists have incorporated investors' psychology into economic models to offer
an alternative framework for reconciling the evidence of these two market regularities
(market under- and over-reaction). Lee (2001) suggests the recent theories evolved as
rational behavioral models because they account for investor sentiments and economic
principles as well.
Each of these models provides a different explanation for empirical findings of
market momeiitum and subsequent price reversals. In general, however, their
explanations fall into two categories. Barberis et al. (1998) and Hong and Stein (1999)
see the short-run continuations and long-horizon reversals in stock returns as distinct and
independent phenomena. They characterize the evidence of market momentum as a
market under-reaction and the evidence of a long-run return reversal as a response to
market over-reaction. Momentum and reversal are attributed to the slow diffusion of
information across groups of investors in Hong and Stein's model and to systematic

investor biases in extrapolating future earnings growth from patterns of past earnings
changes in the model of Barberis et al. (1998). On the other hand, however, Daniel et al.
(1998) break ranks with the prevailing academic explanation by characterizing the market
momentum effects and subsequent price reversals as two integrated phases in the cycle of
a market over-reaction that eventually recovers to the fundamentals, creating momentum
profits in the short run and return reversals over the long run.

1.4 Unanswered Questions
Despite the evidence on the relation between past performance variables and
future stock returns over the last two decades and the recent theoretical development
providing insights into the impact of investors' psychology on market prices, several
questions remain unanswered. How do patterns of firms' past financial performance
variables influence investor expectations about future performance? How does the
interplay between patterns and measurement horizons of past performance metrics affect
the formation of investor perceptions about a firm's future prospects? Finally, is the profit
to be gained from trades based on market momentum and subsequent return reversals a
manifestation of a market over-reaction as suggested by recent empirical and theoretical
works (e.g., Lee and Swaminathan [2000] and Daniel et al. [1998])? Alternatively, are
these two market regularities driven by different and independent forces, as commonly
believed? This thesis attempts to shed some light on these unanswered questions.

1.5 Research Methodologies
Financial performance variables are operationalized by using annual data on sales,
earnings, cash flow, and stock returns from a sample of publicly traded firms listed on the

NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ exchanges from 1983 to 1999. Two testing approaches
are used, the first of which employs portfolio tests. At the end of December, various
equally weighted stock portfolios are formed on the basis of growth patterns (growth and
consistency in growth) for a firm's past financial performance for each measure. Each
year, firms are sorted by the past growth rates in their performance variables and assigned
to one of ten decile growth portfolios on the basis of this ranking.
To construct consistent growth portfolios, each year firms are sorted by growth
rates in their financial performance measures over the previous one through four years
prior to the portfolio formation date and then divided into three growth groups (top 40
percent, middle 20 percent, and bottom 40 percent). Firms in the highest (lowest) 40
percent are called high-growth (low-growth) firms. A high-growth firm that falls in the
top 40 percent in each single year included in the estimation interval is classified as a

"consistent high-growth firm." Similarly, a low-growth firm that consistently ranks in the
bottom 40 percent in each year of the estimation period is defined as a "consistent low-

growth firm. These portfolios are held without rebalancing for the ensuing five years
following portfolio formation. For years 1 through 5, annual returns and size-adjusted
abnormal returns (SAR) are measured. To avoid potential autocorrelation in stock returns
caused by overlapping holding horizons, each year is treated as one observation.
The second testing method uses regression analyses. Cross-sectional regressions
assess the relationships between past performance measures and future returns. In these
regressions, size-adjusted abnormal returns for each firm are regressed on its past
performance variables after controlling for the effects of market betas and market-tobook ratios. The coefficients from these regressions for each of the five years in the

holding period are averaged and t-statistics are calculated using Fama-Macbeth (1973)
procedures.

1.6 The Relations of this Study to Prior Research
Empirical studies in the finance and accounting literature have sought to examine
the relations between a firm's past performance measures (both accounting-based
financial performance and in terms of stock performance) and subsequent stock market
returns. Past performance variables examined have included long-term growth in sales,
earnings, and cash flow (Lakonishok et al., 1994) and La Porta et al., (1997), and
historical stock returns (DeBondt and Thaler, 1985, 1987). The present study is related to
this line of work in investigating the extent information contained in a firm's historical
financial performance can predict its future stock return. However, this thesis differs from
previous studies in several ways.
First, as in Chan et al. (2004), the focus of this study is exploring whether growth
and growth consistency in past financial metrics are most likely to influence investor
perceptions about future firm prospects. Unlike three years used by Chan et al. (2004),
tlie present study uses a longer holding period (five years) to capture the full dynamic
relations between growth patterns of a firm's historical financial measures and its future
stock returns. These differences in methodology allow for tests of the underlying
premises of behavioral finance theories that suggest initial price changes and subsequent
return reversal are manifestations of a market over-reaction (e.g., Daniel et al. [I9981 and
Lee and Swaminathan [2000]). Further, if it takes investors a longer horizon to realize
that their prior expectations were biased, as is the consensus among behavioral theorists

and empiricists, it is reasonable to assume that expanding the holding period will capture
the process by which investors update their prior beliefs about the future prospects of past
winners and losers. Lee and Swaminathan (2000) argue that studies that use holding
horizons of less than five years have failed to capture the dynamics behind the price
momentum and subsequent reversal.
Second, prior studies (e.g., Lakonishok et al. [I9941 and La Porta et al. [1997])
show that fundamental valuation measures deflated by market prices such as earnings-toprice (EIP) and cash-to-price (CIP) ratios have predictive power with respect to
subsequent stock returns. However, using the market price as a deflator in these variables
introduces a confounding effect into the relation between past performance measures and
expected returns. Thus, it becomes difficult to determine whether the ability of these
financial ratios to predict expected returns is due to the fundamental measures in the
numerators themselves (e.g., earnings and cash flow) or to the market price in the
denominators. By using per share lagged values of these measures as deflators, this study
eliminates this potential confounding source and focuses on the marginal impact of past
growth rates in these fundamental measures on stock returns.
Third, previous studies (e.g., Lakonishok et al. [1994], La Porta et al. [1997], and
La Porta [1996]) use earnings plus depreciation to measure a firm's cash flow. Demas,
Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam (2004) argue this definition assumes that depreciation is
the only significant accounting accrual that affects cash flow. Instead, they suggest that
operating cash flow, as defined in the accounting literature (earnings adjusted for
depreciation and working capital accruals), is a more comprehensive measure of a firm's
operating cash flows. In the present study, cash flow is measured in two ways: (1)

earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortization expense, and (2)
earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations adjusted for working
capital accruals as well as depreciation and amortization expense.
Fourth, this study uses prior annual data over time frames ranging from one to
five years to gain insights into the interaction between firms' performance growth
patterns and estimation horizons and effects on investor expectations. The behavioral
models (e.g., Lakonishok et al. [1994], Daniel et al. [1998], and Barbers et al. [1998])
suggest that investors put excessive weight on patterns of a firm's past performance when
projecting its future prospects. DeBondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) report that a firm's
mispricing is an increasing function of measurement intervals of its historical
performance. Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004) find that stocks with higher returns for
longer horizons have large returns compared to their counterparts with high past returns,
but for a shorter time period.
Fifth, the current study investigates whether the profitability of the momentum
strategy and subsequent return reversals are manifestations of market over-reaction to
patterns and measurement horizons of past financial performance. Sixth, the geometric
average is used to compute firms' past growth rates in financial performance measures
while prior studies use the arithmetic average. The arithmetic average may overstate the
historical growth rates in financial performance measures since it merely represents the
summation of annual growth rate divided by the number of years ignoring a
compounding effect. The geometric meail compounds the actual year-to-year growth
rates and translates these annual changes into a single-period growth rate. Finally,
although both the current study and Chan et al.'s (2004) study are motivated by the recent

psychology-based theoretical development (e.g., Barberis et al. [1998], Daniel et al.
[1998], and Hong and Stein [1999]), the present study is not intended to test these
theories as Chan et al. (2004) do.

1.7 Organization of this Study
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the related
literature, while Chapter 3 presents the theoretical and hypotheses development. Chapter
4 discusses performance variables, their measurement, and the sample used in hypothesis
testing. Empirical design and testing methodologies are addressed in Chapter 5. The
empirical results of the study are presented and discussed in Chapter 6. Sensitivity
analyses are included in Chapter 7. Finally, the findings of the study are summarized,
their implications and limitations are discussed, and opportunities for future research are
proposed in Chapter 8.

CHAPTER I1
Literature Review

2.1 Overview
The last two decades have seen a growing body of empirical studies that examine
the relationship between stock returns and measures of past financial performance such as
sales, earnings, cash flow, and past stock returns. These studies document that these
historical measures of firms' performance predict future stock returns. According to this

research stream, firms that achieved high past financial performance tend to be
overvalued; eventually, stock prices of these firms return to their fundamentals, resulting
in low returns over longer horizons. On the other hand, firms that experienced poor past
financial performance become under-priced and subsequently their shares earn higher
returns. These findings have been strongly linked to investor psychology (e.g., DeBondt
and Thaler [1985, 19871, Jegadeesh and Titman [1993, 20011, Lakonishok et al. [1994],
Lee and Swaminathan [2000], Barberis et al. [1998], Daniel et al. [1998], and Hong and
Stein [1999]), and this link is increasingly gaining prominence in the literature (e.g.,
Shleifer [2000]). Researchers have examined two market regularities: market underreactions and market over-reactions. The evidence on these two phenomena is argued to
refute some of the assumptions of market efficiency (e.g., Barberis et al. [1998]). Fama
(1998), however, describes the empirical findings on the market under- and overreactions as unpredicted outcomes that can be observed under market models.

2.2 Evidence of Investor Under-reactions to Past Financial Performance
The market under-reaction hypothesis holds that investors do not adequately
respond to fundamental information in a timely fashion. Rather, new information is
gradually

impounded

into

market

prices,

leading

to

positive

short-horizon

autocorrelations in stock returns or market momentum effects. Barberis et al. (1998)
define a market that under-reacts to information as one in which a firm's average
abnormal return after good news is greater than average abnormal return following bad
news. Over the last two decades numerous studies investigate the predictions of the
under-reaction hypothesis. Major papers in this area will be reviewed next.

To examine the profitability of market momeiitum trading strategies, Jegadeesh
and Titman (1993) study NYSE and AMEX firms from 1968 to 1989. They form
momentum portfolios that take a long position in stocks with the highest returns in the
past three to twelve months and a short position in stocks with the lowest returns over the
same horizons. They then examine the behavior of stock returns over the ensuing 36
months after the portfolio formation period. Their findings show that momentum
portfolios earn mean abnormal returns of about one percent per month over the
subsequent twelve months. However, about one half of this gain is offset by return
reversals over the next 24 month period. As well, they examine the behavior of returns to
their trading strategies around future earnings announcements. They find past winners
outperform past losers on the earnings announcement dates over the first seven months
after formation, while past losers earn higher returns compared to past winners over the
balance of their holding period. They attribute the profitability of this momentum strategy
to investor under-reaction to information contained in past price movements. They argue
that investors are too slow to update their prior beliefs, and this leads to the observed
temporary positive drift in stock returns. Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996)
examine market momentum profitability and how it is affected by earnings drift. To
measure earnings surprise, they use stock price responses to unexpected earnings
announcements, standardized unexpected earnings (SUE), and revision of analysts'
earnings forecasts. They find that these variables, along with past stock returns, predict
subsequent stock returns for Iiorizons ranging from three to twelve months subsequent to
portfolio formation. Stocks of firms with higher earnings surprises or high past returns
are more likely to outperform their counterparts with negative earnings surprises or low

past returns. Consistent with Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), Chan et al. (1996) conclude
that investors do not incorporate information in market prices in a timely manner. Rather,
information is impounded in stock prices after a time lag. They find the earnings drift
partially explains the price momentum effect, but the latter is not subsumed by earnings
surprise effects.
Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) extend their previous analysis to 1998 and report
similar evidence. Their finding shows a cumulative profit for momentum portfolios of
12.17 percent over the first 12 months, but the cumulative return from months 13 through
60 is negative. The findings of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993,2001) are confirmed by Lee
and Swaminathan (2000) who provide evidence that past winners continue to earn higher
returns over three-to-twelve months, but over longer periods of three-to-five years past
losers outperform their past winner counterparts. Similarly, classifying NYSE and
AMEX firms into past winners and losers based on their stock returns for the last six
months, Grundy and Martin (2001) find market momentum returns from the 1920s to the
1990s even after controlling for potential sources of risk exposure.
Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) examine whether industry momentum accounts
for the profitability of .the price momentum strategy. Their findings show that market
momentum is subsumed by industry effects. They suggest that their results could be
indicative of investor herding behavior. In other words, trend chasing investors might
rush to buy (sell) firms in "hot" ("cold") industries. They argue that this pattern of
behavior creates price pressure, leading to continuing price momentum. However, their
findings are contradicted by those of Lee and Swaminathan (2000) and Grundy and
Martin (2000). Lee and Swaminathan (2000) show that only about 20 percent of

momentum gains is explained by industry. Grundy and Martin (2000) find that the
industry effect is not a significant source of momentum returns.

2.3 Evidence of Investor Over-reactions to Past Financial Performance
Studies addressing the market over-reaction hypothesis argue that investors overreact to past financial performance. In this manner, investors drive stocks with high
historical financial measures above their fundamental values. These stocks eventually
under-perform the market over longer periods when investors realize that their previous
expectations have not materialized. On the other hand, prices of stocks with poor past
financial performance are pushed below .their fundamental values. Subsequently, these
stocks earn higher returns over the long horizon when future performance exceeds
investor expectations.

Barberis et al. (1998) define a market that over-reacts to

information as one in which the average return on firm's stock in periods subsequent to a
series of favorable information is lower than the average return after a string of
unfavorable news. The seminal paper of DeBondt and Thaler (1985) is among the
pioneering works that use psychological evidence to explain investor behavior. DeBondt
and Thaler (1985) posit two hypotheses: (1) if investors over-react to information
contained in past financial variables, expected stock returns can be predicted from past
returns alone, and (2) extreme market price movements are followed by another
movement with comparable magnitude, but in the opposite direction. Studying crosssectional data of U.S. stock returns from 1926 to 1982, they provide evidence supporting
their hypotheses. They test their hypotheses by forming investment strategies that call for
buying stocks that have performed poorly in the last five years and selling stocks that

outperformed the market in the same period. They find that buying stocks with lower
returns over the last five years earn about 19.6 percent above the market during the next
three to five years while investment strategies in stocks with higher returns generate
about 5 percent below the market returns in the subsequent three to five years.
However, some subsequent studies (e.g., Chan [I9881 and Ball and Kothari
[1989]) argue that the findings of DeBondt and Thaler (1985) might be explained by such
factors as firm size, January effects, and/or temporal changes in risk factors. DeBondt and
Thaler (1987) and Chopra, Lakonishok, and Ritter (1992) reevaluate the evidence of the
over-reaction effect in the context of these issues. DeBondt and Thaler (1987) show that
their previous evidence is not attributed to firm-specific risk characteristics, size, or
January effects. To examine whether the market over-reaction evidence documented by
DeBondt and Thaler (1985) can be explained by the methodological problems raised in
the above studies, Chopra et al. (1992) use time-varying betas and shorter windows to
measure abnormal returns while controlling for firm size and January effects. They
conclude that there is strong evidence of market over-reactions and those temporal
changes in risk factors, firm size, and the turn-of-the year (January) effects are unlikely to
account for this result. As well, they find long-term losers outperform their cohort
winners around the announcement dates of subsequent quarterly earnings and argue that
this evidence is consistent with the market over-reaction hypothesis.
Lakonishok et al. (1994) report that past low performing firms, measured by their
past growth in sales and earnings and cash flow relative to market prices, yield superior
future returns compared to past high performing firms. They attribute their findings to
systematic investor biases and argue that investors overweight a firm's past growth when

predicting its future outlooks. This biased expectation drives market prices of high (low)
growth firms above (below) their fundamental values; subsequently, these firms' shares
earn lower (higher) future returns relative to the market.
Using NYSE and AMEX firms from 1963 to 1990, La Porta et al. (1997)
investigate whether greater stock returns achieved by value strategies are due to risk
factors or investors' biased expectations. To classify firms into value and growth firms,
they use different fundamentallprice measures, such as sales, earnings, and cash flow
relative to market prices. Based on these accounting ratios over the last five years, they
classify stocks into three groups: top 30, middle 40, and bottom 30 percentiles. They then
examine the returns for these groups over the ensuing five years. Controlling for various
risk factors, they show that value stocks outperform growth stock over the holding period
by about 10 to 11 percent per year. They then examine the returns around the
announcement periods of future quarterly earnings. They find a significant portion of the
returns to value and growth stocks is concentrated arouiid the earnings announcement
dates. They conclude that investors systematically exhibit biased expectations about
future growtli of both value and growth stocks. Investors expect past financial
performance of growth firms to persist but when their expectations are proven false, stock
prices of these firms revert to their fundamental values, resulting in low returns.
Conversely, investors underestimate the future growth of value stocks, driving their
market price below their fundamentals; eventually, these stocks earn higher returns when
their future performance beats expectations.
La Porta (1 996) analyzes the return differentials between value and growth stocks
in terms of future earnings growth rates forecasted by financial analysts from 1982 to

1990. He argues that if investors over-react to stocks with high forecasted earnings
growth, market prices would be driven above their fundamental values, and as a result,
growth stocks should have low returns when their prices revert to value. On the other
hand, stocks with low analysts' expected growth rates are more likely to be under-valued.
Eventually, these stocks would exhibit higher returns. His findings indicate that firms
with low expected earnings growth outperform those with high expected earnings growth
by about 20 percent over the first year after the portfolio formation. The difference in
returns between value and growth stocks continues through year five after the formatioil
horizon. In the first year following the formation date, analysts drastically revise their
earnings forecasts upward (downward) for value (growth) stocks. Additionally, he
examines the return of value and growth stocks at the announcement dates of projected
quarterly earnings. His evidence shows that firms with low predicted growth rates
outperform the market around the announcement dates, while their counterpart firms with
high expected earnings growth under-perform the market. He argues that his findings are
not affected by firm size, booldmarket effects, as well as other potential risk exposures.
In interpreting his overall evidence, he suggests that his findings provide strong support
to the expectational error hypothesis.
Studies investigating the returns to trading strategies formed based on some value
metrics relative to market prices, such as booldmarket, fundamentallmarket measures,
and other accounting variables, provide evidence that is consistent with a market overreaction. For example, firms with high booldmarket (BIM) measures outperform their
counterpart with low BIM ratios (e.g., Fama and French [1992, 19931). Some studies
have linked the BIM ratio effect to risk exposures. Fama and French (1992, 1993) argue

that firms with high B/M ratios are more likely to be financially distressed firms, and the
higher returns on these stocks are rewards for more risk exposures. However, other
empirical studies suggest that the B/M ratio effect is attributed to market mispricing.
Dichev (1998) shows that there is no association between bankruptcy risk and future
returns of high B/M firms. La Porta et al. (1997) and Skinner and Sloan (2002) examine
the market reaction to the announcements of subsequent earnings for both value and
growth firms. They find value stocks exhibit higher returns than their growth stock
counterparts around the announcement dates. They find value firms outperform their
growth firm counterparts around those dates. They argue that there is a systematic bias in
the manner in which investors formulate their predictions about future earnings of these
stocks. They further argue that the effect associated with high (low) B/M firms is due to
investors' biased expectations about the future prospects of these firms rather than
potential risk exposures. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that any market mispricing
cannot be arbitraged away in a timely manner if arbitrage costs are greater than its profits.
They then assert that arbitrage risk (the volatility of arbitrage returns) impedes
arbitrageurs' trading activities, and it is more likely to be an important factor behind the
persistence of the B/M effect. Ali et al. (2003) empirically examine Shleifer and Vishny's
(1997) conjecture to determine whether the B/M effect is related to arbitrage risk or
mispricing. They show that the effect of B/M firms is greater for stock with higher
transaction costs, higher return volatility, and low investor sophistication. They conclude
arbitrage risk exposures are not likely to be the source of abnormal returns achieved by
high B/M firms as suggested by Shleifer and Vishny (1997).

In recent years, several empirical studies (e.g., Frankel and Lee [I9981 and Lee et
al. [I9991 have shown that the value-price ratio (VIP) predicts subsequent abnormal
returns for horizons up to three years. Frankel and Lee (1998) form a trading strategy
based on the valuelprice ratio (VIP) for each year from 1977 to 1992. The trading strategy
takes long (short) positions in firms in the highest (lowest) VIP quintiles. They report that
this investment strategy generate returns of 3.1, 15.2, and 30.6 percent over one, two, and
three years, respectively, following the formation horizon. Lee et al. (1999) examine the
time-series properties of VIP and its ability to predict expected returns compared to other
fundamental measures. They find that VIP is a better predictor of future stock returns
than other fundanlentallprice ratios. Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan [1999], Gode and
Mohanram (2001), and Piotroski (2001) use different measures (historical earnings) to
operatioiialize the residual-income model and reach similar conclusions to those of
Frankel and Lee (1998) and Lee et al. (1999).
Ali et al. (2003) address several concerns raised about whether the VIP effect is
attributed to market mispricing or risk factors (e.g., Beaver [2002], Kothari [2001], and
Lo and Lys [2000]). Using analyst earnings forecasts to operationalize the residual
income model and data from 1976 to 1997, Ali et al. (2003) replicate the study of Frankel
and Lee (1998), reporting similar findings to those of Frankel and Lee (1 998). The longshort portfolio of Ali et al. (2003) earns abnormal returns of 5.7, 15.5, and 31.1 percent
over holding horizons of one, two and three years, respectively. They find that most of
the VIP effect is concentrated around the announcements of subsequent earnings. They
argue that this evidence is consistent with the market misvaluation explanation and this
mispricing corrects itself when future earnings information becomes known. Even after

controlling for an extensive set of proxies for risk factors (Gebhardt, Lee, and
Swaminathan [2001], Gode and Mohanram [2001], and Ali et al. [2003]) find the VIP
variable continues to have a strong association with future returns. They interpret their
findings as supportive of mispricing explanations over risk-based explanations.
Substituting actual realized earnings for analysts' earnings forecast in the residual-income
model, Zhou (2002) shows that the predictive ability of VIP for future returns is superior
to that of VIP ratios based on analysts' forecasts.
Given the ability of VIP measures to predict subsequent stock returns over longer
horizons, the argument related to growth and value firms can be extended to VIP firms.
Firms with high VIP ratios can be characterized as value firms, while firms with low VIP
ratios can be viewed as growth firms. High VIP stocks outperform their low VIP
counterparts because the former are undervalued, and subsequently these stocks should
earn excess returns when their performance beats market expectations. On the other hand,
low VIP firms are overvalued because they are expected to perform well in the future.
But when their future performance falls short of expectations, their market prices recover
to their fundamentals, resulting in low returns.
Chan et al. (2004) investigate investor over-reaction to high (low) past financial
performance as measured by accounting variables, namely growth rates in sales, net
income, and operating income. Using (quarterly data for one year) annual data for five
years, they find no discernable evidence of price reversals over the following (12months) 36-m0nths.~They interpret their findings as evidence contrary to behavioral

They find weak evidence of price momentum in first year, which they argue is subsumed by earnings drift
effects.

theories suggesting that patterns of firms' past financial performance may cause investor
to form misperceptions about the future prospects of these firms.
However, the findings of Chan et al. (2004) might be attributed to the following
three issues. First, the holding horizon may not be long enough to capture long-horizon
price reversals. Lee and Swaminathan (2000) argue that previous studies using shorter
horizons than five years to examine stock return behavior have failed to capture the
pattern of long-run return reversals. Other studies that examine the behavior of stock
prices following high (low) historical performance measures provide evidence of postformation price drifts for the first year and long horizon reversals in the third through the
fifth years after the formation period (e.g., DeBondt and Thaler [1985, 19871 and
Jegadeesh and Titman [1993,2001]).
Second, Chan et al. (2004) calculate past growth rates in sales, net income,
operating income as the difference between per share value of each measure at time t and
per share values for these measures at time t-5 divided by sales per share as the deflator
for sales growth and net asset per share as the deflator for both net income and operating
income. This procedure may results in two potential biases: (1) growth rates in these
variables are likely to be susceptible to extreme observations at both ends of the
estimation period and (2) growth rates in net income and operating income scaled by net
assets per share at time t-5 may not reflect market expectations if investors do not take
asset growth into account when assessing a firm's growth. Lakonishok et al. (1994) argue
that a measure that captures investors' expectations about the future prospects of value
firms should result in high returns for value investment strategies. Finally, when testing
price reversals, Chan et al. (2004) regress raw returns of their portfolio on the three

Fama-French factors after adding a fourth factor to account for the effects of rn0mentum.j
These price-containing factors might proxy for mispricing rather than risk exposures
(e.g., Hirslileifer [2001]).

2.4 Conflicting Evidence of Investor Reactions
Performance

to Past Financial

Early studies that examine market momentum effects and long horizon price
reversals consider these two market regularities to be distinct and independent
phenomena. This characterization of market under- and over-reactions is the commonly
held point of view among researchers in this area. However, recent studies have provided
mixed evidence about the link between under- and over-reaction effects. Jegadeesh and
Titman (200 1) show that stocks with high (low) returns during the past six months exhibit
price momentum over the next twelve months following the formation date. After the
first year, however, prior losers outperform past winners. This pattern continues through
the end of the fifth year after the portfolio formation. This evidence is similar to that
documented in previous studies (e.g., Jegadeesh and Titman [I9931 and Lee and
Swaminathan [2000]).
Lee and Swaminathan (2000) provide evidence that past winners continue to earn
higher returns over three to twelve months subsequent to the formation date, but over
longer horizons (three to five years), prior losers earn higher returns than past winners.
For example, by the end of year five, almost the entire momentum gains (1 1.56 percent)
over the first twelve months of the holding horizon have been offset by return reversals
5

The three Fama-French factors: the market return risk-free rate (RM-RF),high B/M return-low B/M return
(HML), and small firm return-big firm return (SMB).

(10.95 percent) during the last two years of the holding period. They argue that market
momentum is a result of market over-reaction to past performance that subsequently
corrects itself when investors realize that their prior expectations were not accurate. They
further argue that prior studies that use shorter holding horizons of up to three years have
not captured these patterns of price momentum and subsequent reversal. The evidence
that links price momentum and long horizon reversals is consistent with recent theoretical
development (e.g., Daniel et al. [1998]). Daniel et al. characterize the market momentum
and long-run return reversals as a manifestation of an investor over-reaction that leads to
temporal momentum gains and subsequent price reversals when market prices converge
to their fundamentals.
On the other hand, Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004) argue that market momentum
and price reversal effects do not suggest that these two phenomena are driven by the
same investor sentiments. Rather, market under- and over-reactions seem to have evolved
independently of each other. They then assert that .their findings cast doubt on recent
theory suggesting that momentum and reversal effects are driven by the same forces.
They conclude that if there is a link between the momentum profits and subsequent price
reversals, it is certainly a weaker one because these two market regularities do not exhibit
the same behavior.
Whether the market momentum and long-run price reversal are driven by
independent forces, as commonly believed, or both of these phenomena are products of a
market over-reaction that eventually returns to fundamental values, the extensive body of
evidence, reviewed in the preceding two subsections suggests that there are systematic
investor biases that can be exploited for generating trading profits without bearing extra

risk. However, Fama (1998) argues that the evidence on market under- and over-reactions
is pure chance and it does not represent a departure from market efficiency because the
frequency of price momentum and reversal effects is equally distributed. Conrad and
Kaul (1998) argue that documented abnormal profits of price momentum and reversal
trading strategies are attributed to the cross-sectional dispersion in average stock returns
rather than to the time-series properties of historical returns. They argue that momentum
and contrarian investment strategies that are formed based on unconditional patterns of
past performance are equally profitable as those constructed on the basis of past
performance measures.
However, Bloomfield, Libby, and Nelson (2002) assert that Fama's (1998)
argument might be correct if market momentum and subsequent return reversals cannot
be predicted. On the other hand, if circumstances exist in which these market regularities
can be anticipated by rational investors and exploited to earn abnormal profits, then
under-reaction and over-reaction effects do not square with the market models. The
assertion of Conrad and Kaul (1998) is refuted by more recent studies (e.g., Grundy and
Martin [2001] and Jegadeesh and Titman [2001,2002]). Grundy and Martin (2001), who
analyze the sources of price momentum profits using data going back to 1920s, conclude
that the momentum effect is neither due to the differences in the cross-sectional mean
return as suggested by Conrad and Kaul (1998) nor to potential risk exposures. Jegadeesh
and Titman (2001, 2002) examine the Conrad and Kaul (1998) conjecture. Jegadeesh and
Titman (2001) find stock returns of past winners (losers) continue to drift upward
(downward) over the first twelve months after the formation horizon, but past losers
outperform their winner counterparts thereafter through the five years following the

portfolio formation. They reject the hypothesis of Conrad and Kaul (1998). Jegadeesh
and Titman (2002) revisit this issue using similar methods used by Conrad and Kaul
(1998). They conclude that the variability of cross-sectional average stock returns is not
the source for the profitability of price momentum strategies. They argue that the
evidence reported by Conrad and Kaul(1998) is due to sample biases.
With the mounting evidence challenging the standard market models, the
behavioral finance models are increasingly gaining prominence as alternative
explanations for the growing body of evidence on stock return predictability. However,
before the behavioral based-models can develop a comprehensive theoretical framework
that explains the mechanism of market prices and how they are affected by the behavior
of market participants, behavioral theorists should come to terms with the following
critical questions. First, what factors are more likely to influence investor expectations
with respect to the future financial performance of a firm or group of firms? Second, does
the interaction between these factors and their measurement horizons influence investor
expectations? Third, are the documented price momentum and reversals distinct and
independent phenomena or are both a manifestation of a market over-reaction that
eventually recovers to the fundamentals as suggested by recent empirical and theoretical
works (e.g., Lee and Swaminathan [2000], Jegadeesh and Titman [2001], and Daniel et
al. [1998])? Finally, if the market exhibits both under- and over-reaction as it is
commonly believed, then what are the circumstances in which the market is expected to
under-react or over-react?

CHAPTER I11
Theoretical Development and Research Hypotheses

3.1 Investor Psychology-Based Theories
Efficient market theory makes two strong predictions about the behavior of
market prices and returns: observed market prices are equivalent to their fundamental
values, and market returns cannot be predicted from publicly available information.
Therefore, it follows that all stocks are properly priced and observed stock prices are
equal to the present values of all expected future payments (e.g., dividends) based on the
information set available at the valuation date (e.g., Fama [1965, 19911).
However, an extensive body of literature reviewed in Chapter 2 suggests
otherwise. Furthermore, Shiller (1 98 1, 2003) and Campbell and Sliiller (1987, 1988)
argue that stock prices deviate significantly and frequently from their fundamental values.
With more empirical evidence of these market regularities, the behavioral finance models
have emerged as a viable research alternative (Thaler, 1999). Lee (2001) concurs, stating
that empirical evidence is increasingly consistent with this concept. He argues that
market efficiency can be better characterized as a journey rather than a final destination.
Market prices are continuously seeking their equilibrium through the interaction of
imperfectly rational traders and well-informed arbitrage~rs.~He argues that in this
context, it is iiaTve and conceptually unsound to equate observed market prices with their
fundamental values because such equality is a mischaracterization of the price discovery
6

In equilibrium, market prices are a weighted average of investor beliefs and preferences and they are
not necessarily equal to fundamental values.

mechanism in which market prices converge toward fundamental values over time
through the interplay of market forces.
However, before the behavioral finance models become accepted as a competing
paradigm explaining the market price formation process and how it is affected by the
behavior of market participants, behavioral finance theorists should address several
critical issues including:
How do patterns of firms' historical measures affect investor expectations about
firms' future performance prospects?
Are market price momentum and reversal effects a product of the same investor
psychology or are these market regularities driven by different factors?
In recent years, several studies attempt to explain the nature and underlying
causes of market under-reaction and over-reaction (e.g., Daniel et al. [1998], Barberis et
al. [1998], and Hong and Stein [1999]). Barberis et al. (1998) offer an investor learning
model based on two psychological concepts, representativeness heuristics and
conservatism, to explain why a market under-reacts to information in some cases and
over-reacts in others. In this model, firms' actual earnings follow a random walk, but
investors believe that earnings switch between a continuing regime and a mean-reverting
regime. Earnings changes are positively autocorrelated in the former and negatively
autocorrelated in the latter. Investors use the historical behavior of a firm's earnings
changes to predict its future earnings. Due to the representativeness heuristic bias, firms
with consistent earnings growth (declines) in the past are believed to be in a continuing
regime. By over-weighting the time-series properties of extreme financial performance
when forecasting firms' future earnings, investors create a market over-reaction that

subsequently reverts to the fundamentals leading to long-horizon price reversals.
Alternatively, conservatism bias leads investors to mistakenly conclude that firms are in a
reversion stage when current earnings change after several earnings reversals. As a
result, new information is being slowly incorporated in market prices leading to a
momentum effect. In short, investors under-react to earnings changes following a series
of earnings reversals and over-react to earnings changes following a series of
performance changes in the same direction.
Daniel et al. (1998) focus on investors' overconfidence and self-attribution biases.
Both concepts are based on experimental and survey evidence from the cognitive
psychological literature. This literature suggests that people have an inclination to exhibit
overconfidence in their skills, abilities, and knowledge, and this overconfidence is
exacerbated when tasks are challenging and complex or when feedback is ui~clearor
inconclusive (e.g., Trivers [1985, 199 11, Alpert and Raiffa [I 9821, and Fischhoff, Slovic,
and Lichtenstein [19771).~Daniel et al. (1998) argue that stock markets involve a high
degree of uncertainty (e.g., forecasting future cash flows) and the feedback in such
settings is often vague and untimely. They predict that overconfidence bias is more
likely to be strong in stocks that are difficult to value (e.g., growth stocks). The cognitive
psychology literature indicates that individuals are more likely to attribute success to their
own superior qualities and failure to externalities. In the capital market context, Daniel et
al. (1998) argue that investors learn about their abilities to identify winning stocks in a
biased manner. Initially, investors observe fundamental signals about a set of stocks and
subsequently receive information that either confirms or contradicts these signals. Due to

Also, see Hirshleifer (2001) and Odean (1998) for reviews.

their self-biased attribution, investors attribute favorable outcomes to their higher skills
and adverse outcomes to bad luck. As a consequence, investors become overly confident
of their stock-picking skills. This leads to further market over-reactions before stock
prices eventually revert to fundamentals, resulting in long-run price reversals.
Simultaneously, disconfirming events have little or no impact on their confidence level.
Hong and Stein's (1999) study includes two groups of investors that have
different biases: (1) news watchers or informed investors and (2) momentum traders or
trend chasers. Both groups are risk averse and imperfectly rational because they fail to
incorporate other sources of information into their decision-making processes. Informed
investors base their trading activities on fundamental information about future payoffs,
but ignore information from other sources (e.g., historical behavior of past price
movements). On other hand, trend chasers form the bases for their trades on the behavior
of past price changes. Trend chasing by momentum investors may initially improve
market efficiency, but eventually market prices will be driven away from fundamentals
when more trend chasers enter the market. Subsequently, this leads to long-term price
reversals.
The explanations of market momentum and long-horizon reversal effects
provided by these models can be classified in two categories. Barberis et al. (1998) and
Hong and Stein (1999) view price momentum and subsequent reversals as two distinct
and independent market regularities. They see a price continuation as evidence of a
market under-reaction and a long-run price reversal as a response to a market overreaction. Their characterization of these phenomena is consistent with the widely held
view among many researchers. According to Barberis et al.'s (1998) theory, the

conservatism and representativeness heuristic biases are driving factors behind underreaction and over-reaction effects, respectively. On the other hand, Hong and Stein
theorize that the momentum returns and subsequent reversals is a result of slow diffusion
of information across subgroups of investors.
Contrary to Barberis et al. (1998) and Stein (1999), Daniel et al. (1 998) argue that,
due to an overconfidence bias, investors over-react to information signals driving stock
prices away from their fundamental values. This initial over-reaction is pushed even
further as more signals confirm investors' previous actions, resulting in positive return
drifts before prices eventually recover to fundamental values (long-term return reversals).
This theory asserts that price momentum and subsequent reversals are manifestations of a
market over-reaction that corrects itself over time as investors come to realize that their
prior expectations have not materialized. This characterization of these phenomena is
consistent with evidence from the cognitive psychology literature and related empirical
~ t u d i e s .Studies
~
examining the behavior of stock returns following exceptional financial
performance reveal that stock prices continue to move in the same direction over the first
twelve months, but this pattern reverses at horizons of three-to-five years (e.g., DeBondt
and Thaler [1985, 19871, Jegadeesh and Titman [1993, 20011, and Lee and Swaminathan
[2000]).

3.2 Hypotheses Development
Classic economic models hold two assumptions about human behavior.
Individuals have (1) infinite rationality and (2) infinite information processing capacities.
8

Evidence on cognitive psycl~ologyliterature related to overconfidence and self-attribution biases is
reviewed in subsection 3.2.

The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) (Sharpe 1964 and Lintner 1965), the efficient
market hypothesis (Fama 1965), and the arbitrage pricing theory (APT) (Ross 1976) are
based on these two assumptions. The traditional market argument posits that, even if
investors have judgment biases and errors, these biases and errors are independent across
individuals. Thus, in market equilibrium, these human mistakes average out and should
not influence market prices. However, theoretical and empirical work that is motivated by
evidence on experimental psychological literature suggests that human biases are
pervasive and no one seems to be immune to these biases. Hirshleifer (2001), Barberis et
al. (1998), Daniel et al. (1998), DeBondt and Thaler (1985, 1987), Lakonishok et al.
(1994), La Porta et al. (1997), Lee and Swaminathan (2000), and Jegadeesh and Titman
(1993, 2001) argue that investors systematically hold biased expectations and their biases
significantly affect market prices. Hirshleifer (2001) argues that due to limitations of
time, information processing abilities, memory, attention, and other cognitive resource
constraints, people use "heuristic simplification" to address complex decision problems.
Because individuals have limited time and brainpower, they are not expected to tackle
challenging problems optimally (Mullainathan and Thaler, 2000).
Much of the research in decision-making and judgment bias stems from the work
of experimental psychologists such as Tversky, Kahneman, and Simon. Tversky and
Kahneman (1974) argue that individuals are inclined to classify things into discrete
categories based on the degree to which these things share the salient cliaracteristics of
their original populations. They suggest that individuals' judgments about forming
categories are significantly influenced by past patterns and sequences of data even if
these patterns and sequences represent a short period.

Chan et al. (2004) argue that the representativeness heuristic of Tversky and
Kahneman (1 974) underlies most behavioral theory that explains the behavior of market
prices in terms of investor sentiments. Barberis et al. (1998) argue that, due to the
representativeness heuristic bias, investors observing series of constant past positive
(negative) earnings changes over sufficiently long periods tend to extend this pattern of
past earnings changes into firms' future positive (negative) earnings prospects. They go
on to argue that this extrapolation of the behavior of firms' past earnings growth to the
future drives firms' stock prices away from their rational expected values. Subsequently,
prices will revert to .their fundamentals, resulting in long run reversal. Consistent with the
notion of the representativeness heuristic bias, Nissett and Wilson (1 977a) suggest that
people are more likely to extend an outstanding characteristic they like about an
individual to other attributes of this individual. As well, Lakonishok et al. (1994) and
Shefrin and Statman (1995) argue that if investors erroneously extend their favorable
evaluation of a firm's future earnings prospects to its expected stock returns, a firm's
stock will be over-priced.
In his theory of bounded rationality, Simon (1955) is among the first to point out
the flawed premises of economic theories that describe economic agents as having
infinite rationality and information processing capacity.9 He argues that the nature and
complexity of economic decisions limit the abilities of individuals to make rational
decisions. His argument is consistent with several well-known psychological biases that
are posited to influence individual judgments and decision-making processes. Two of
these are the overconfidence bias and self-attribution bias. These concepts have been
9

According to Simon (1955), bounded rationality refers to the limitations of information processing ability
and complexity of decision problems that prevent individual from making perfectly rational decisions.

argued to significantly affect the way investors analyze, internalize, and institutionalize
their abilities to arrive at appropriate investment decisions. It is acknowledged in the
cognitive psychology literature that people are usually overconfident in their abilities,
knowledge, and skills (see e.g., Trivers [1985, 19911, Alpert and Raiffa [1982], and
Fischhoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein [1977], Hirshleifer [2001], and Odean [1998b].
In reviewing psychological evidence that underlies behavioral finance models,
DeBondt and Thaler (1995) conclude that, with respect to individual judgments and
decisions, the most robust findings in the psychological literature are that people are
overconfident in their choices and actions. According to the self-deception theory
(Trivers 199I), individuals believe they are smarter, stronger, and better friends than they
actually are. Taylor and Brown (1998) suggest that believing in oneself is a significant
driver of higher performance and eventually leads to greater success, but heavily overestimating one's qualities results in biased judgments.
Several studies that review psychological evidence (e.g., Einhorn [1980], Odean
[1998b], Daniel et al. [ 19981, and Hirshleifer [200 11) indicate that overconfidence bias
becomes more severe when tasks at hand are difficult, when there is a significant time
lapse between the accomplishment of the tasks and feedback, or when feedback is unclear
or ambiguous. According to Daniel et al.'s (1998) theory, investors are inherently biased
in the way they assess their ability to value and identify winning securities; they
systematically view themselves as having better investment skills than they actually do.
Thus, investors' overconfidence is predicted to be high anlong stocks that are difficult to
value,

such as those

with widely varying

historical

financial

performance.

Overconfidence in capital market settings is not a phenomenon of inexperienced and

naYve traders alone, but sophisticated investors as well, who may exhibit even greater
overconfidence in their ability. Griffin and Tversky (1992) argue that in the stock market
where returns predictability is low, professional investors are more likely to be
overconfident in their expertise in market theories and models.
The conventional wisdom is that we learn about our skills, abilities, and
knowledge as well as the precision of our decisions by reflecting on our experience and
observing the consequences of our actions. However, the literature on empirical
psychology suggests that people update their prior beliefs in a biased manner.
Experimental psychologists find that people are more likely to attribute success to their
superior qualities and failure to bad luck or externalities over which they had no control
(e.g., Miller and Ross [1975], Langer and Roth [1975], and Hastorf, Schneider, and
Polifia [1970]). The attribution theory of Bem (1965) holds that individuals are prone to
attribute outcomes that confirm their predictions to their personal abilities and outcomes
that disagree with their expectations to chance.
Evidence from the experimental psychological literature also reveals that
individuals are more likely to recall information about their successes rather than their
failures. Disposition effects predict that investors tend to sell their winning stocks too
soon and hold onto their losers too long (Shefrin and Titman 1985), a finding confirmed
by Odean (1998a). Odean (1998b) argues that, if investors judge their abilities to make
good investment decisions based on their realized returns, their judgment would be
upwardly biased because they realize few losses relative to gains. He argues that
investors do not receive timely feedback about their losers compared to feedback about
winners, and this contributes to self-attribution bias. Daniel et al. (1998) argue that due to

self-attribution bias, events that support investor prior beliefs significantly increase their
overconfidence bias, while events that contradict their prior beliefs have little or no
impact on their self-confidence. According to their theory, overconfidence bias creates an
environment conducive to market over-reaction. As well, the self-attribution bias leads to
more market over-shooting before investors realize that their previous expectations were
false. A number of empirical studies examining the behavior of market prices of value
and growth stocks (e.g., Lakonishok et al. [1994], La Porta et al. [1997], and La Porta
[1996]) report evidence that lends support to the predictions of Daniel et al.'s theory.
They argue that the lower future performance of growth stocks compared to the
performance of value stocks is due to biased investor expectations. They further argue
that investors excessively over-weight patterns of firms' past performance measures
when forecasting firms' future performance prospects. Consequently, stock prices of
growth (value) firms are more likely to rise above (below) their fundamental values, but
when future outcomes become known, investors become disappointed (optimistic) and
stock prices revert to their fundamentals.
Odean (1998b) suggests that there are two other factors that may contribute to the
overconfidence in the stock market: self-selection bias and survivorship bias. Odean
(1998b) argues that individuals that tend be more overconfident in their abilities and
skills than the rest of the population are more likely to participate in the markets. He also
argues that survivorship bias may lead to financial markets controlled by overconfident
investors since unsuccessful investors are more likely to drop out of the market while
survivors become more overconfident and wealthy.

Taken together, experimental and survey evidence from the cognitive
psychological literature, as well as theories and empirical studies motivated by the
theoretical research literature, strongly suggest that human judgment and decision making
processes are inherently biased. The degree of bias in human judgment depends on the
nature, context, and complexity of the decision problems. In capital market settings,
investors are required to deal with highly speculative issues such as future cash flows and
deciding which securities are more likely to have the highest expected returns. In such an
environment, feedback in many cases is inconclusive and late. Daniel et al. (1998) argue
that the conlplexity of investment decisions and the vagueness or lack of immediate
feedback in stock market contexts facilitates the overconfidence bias which is extremely
suggestive of a market over-reaction. They argue that the self-attribution bias may cause
additional over-reactions as f ~ ~ t uevidence
re
confirms investor prior beliefs.
According to the theory of Barberis et al. (1998), investors use the behavior of
firms' earnings changes in the past to predict firms' future earnings performance.
Barberis et al. (1998) argue that due to the representativeness heuristic bias, investors
over-react to firms with steady historical earnings changes over sufficiently long
horizons, driving stock prices of these firms away from their rationally expected values.
Eventually, however, stock prices will revert to their fundamental values when the market
determines that those prior expectations were incorrect.

3.2.1 Investor Over-reactions to Growth in Past Firm Financial Performance

The representativeness heuristic suggests that individuals tend to think in discrete
and distinct categories (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). Mullainathan (2001) argues that

people are imperfectly rational because they think in completely distinct categories and
give excessive weight to the most representative scenario while ignoring the most
plausible alternative. Barberis et al.'s (1998) theory holds that, due to the
representativeness heuristic bias, firms with a series of consecutive positive or negative
earnings changes lead investors to form biased expectations about the future profitability
of these firms. Accordingly, firms with high past financial growth tend to be over-priced
and firms with low (decreasing or possibly negative) growth over the same period
become under-priced. However, in time, stocks prices of these firms will revert to their
fundamental values when investors' expectations are proven inaccurate.
Chan et al. (2004) argue that if investors follow the representativeness heuristics
approach when evaluating firms based on growth rates in their past performance
measures, a firm is likely to be placed in one of the following group: high, low, or nongrowing firms. Experimental psychology research suggests that salient and attentiongrabbing information such as extreme clues that stand out in their context are more likely
to be given more emphasis than abstract, statistical, and/or less relevant signals included
in background data. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) consider an information signal to be
salient if it has distinct characteristics that differentiate it in its context (e.g., background)
or a past state. These outstanding attributes draw one's attention or create cues that
facilitate recall.
The above assertion is supported by evidence from the cognitive psychology
literature on how individuals learn over time through observing stochastic variables that
are functions of multiple cues (e.g., Kruschke and Johansen, 1999). This literature
indicates that people fail to develop a comprehensive understanding of the associations

between these variables and competing cues. As a consequence, effects of salient cues
dominate effects of other cues. Sirri and Tufano (1998) find that new investments in
mutual funds are more likely to flow into those that experienced outstanding financial
performance relative to their peers in the recent past. This evidence indicates that
investors extrapolate past growth into the future, although empirical studies suggest that
there is little or no evidence that the high performance will persist.
Chan et al. (2004) use trends and sequences in past financial measures,
specifically

sales, net

income, and operating

income, to

operationalize the

representativeness heuristic bias. They argue that these financial variables are credible
means for testing the predictions of behavioral theories because these measures are both
salient and readily available for a broad spectrum of market participants. They suggest
that the recent catastrophic market reactions to fraudulent financial reports and
disclosures underscore the importance and the salient features of accounting information.
Drawing on the preceding arguments, the following hypotheses are presented in their
alternate forms:

Hypothesis 1: If relative high (low) past sales growth influences investor expectations

about a firm's future performance prospects, stock prices of firms with higher (lower:
falling or possibly negative) past sales growth are more likely to be over-priced (underpriced) and subsequently these stocks should earn low (high) returns over the long term.
Hypothesis 2: Ifrelative high (low) past earnings growth influences investor expectations

about a firm's future performance prospects, stock prices of firms with higher (lower:
falling or possibly negative) past earnings growth are more likely to be over-priced
(under-priced) and subsequently these stocks should earn low (high) returns over the
long term.

Hypothesis 3: I f relative high (low) past cash jlow growth influences investor
expectations about a firm's future performance prospects, stock prices of firms with
higher (lower: falling or possibly negative) past cash jlow growth are more likely to be
over-priced (under-priced) and subsequently these stocks should earn low (high) returns
over the long term.

Hypothesis 4: I f relative high (low) past market returns influence investor expectations
about a firm's future performance prospects, stock prices of firms with higher (lower:
falling or possibly negative) past returns are more likely to be over-priced (under-priced)
and subsequently these stocks should earn low (high) returns over the long term.

3.2.2 Investor Over-reactions to Consistency in Past Firm Financial Performance
Chan et al. (2004) suggest that patterns of past financial realizations are
significant factors underlying most recent psychology-based theories. Grinblatt and
Moskowitz (2004) find consistency in past stock returns is a crucial determinant of
momentum profitability. They report that consistently winning stocks outperform other
stocks across all formation and holding horizons. In an experimental setting, Tversky and
Kahneman (1974) observe that subjects given historical data and asked to form groups
based on these data tend to place too much weight on the historical patterns of these data
even if these patterns existed only for a short time.
Daniel et al. (1998) argue that investors are overconfident in their ability to
analyze financial data and identify profitable stocks; their overconfidence bias becomes
even more severe for stocks whose values are difficult to determine such as those with
consistently high (low) financial performance in the past. As well, they argue that due to
the self-attribution bias, investors' overconfidence is dramatically boosted by favorable

feedback but only marginally dampened by adverse outcomes. According to their theory,
sufficiently high (low) financial measures facilitate an initial market over-reaction, and
consistency in such measures is more likely to invite further over-reactions. Over the long
term, however, stock prices will revert to their fundamentals as investors learn that their
prior expectations did not materialize. The predictions of Daniel et al.'s theory are
consistent with the evidence of the effects of price momentum and subsequent reversals
effects documented by a number of studies that examine stock price movements
following high (low) past returns (e.g., Lee and Swaminathan [2000] and Jegadeesh and
Titman [1993, 20011).
The representativeness heuristic bias theory suggests that individuals have a
strong inclination to classify events into distinct and independent categories based on
salient characteristics which these events share with their original population (Tversky
and Kahneman 1974). In so doing, however, individuals tend to overestimate the actual
probability that a particular event does indeed belong in a certain population. At the same
time, they underestimate that only a few events belong in this population. Barberis et al.
(1998) argue that consistently high (low) firm historical performance measures over
sufficiently long horizons lead investors to mistakenly conclude that these time-series
properties of a

firm's past realization are truly representative of the firm's future

earnings. In an experimental capital market setting, Bloomfield and Hales (2002) test the
predictions of Barberis et al. (1998) using MBA students. They report that their
experiment's participants tend to believe that a firm's change in earnings is more likely to
hold in the future unless it follows a significant number of reversals. They interpret their

findings as indicative of a market over-reaction to patterns of a firm's historical financial
performance.
Chan et al. (2004) suggest that consistent patterns of financial performance over
longer horizons should be more salient and increase investors' confidence leading to
more definitive classifications of firms into distinct and discrete categories based on past
performance. They argue that firms consistently achieving high (low) financial
performance in the past should trigger stronger market over-reactions and, as a result,
these firms should be mispriced; subsequently, they should experience low (high) returns.
Barberis and Huang (2001) propose a model in which firms' discount rates are
viewed as a function of their past performance. Consistent with prospect theory
(Kahneman and Tversky [1979, 19811, they model investors' utility as a product of prior
gains and losses. Owners of consistently winning (losing) stocks have a higher (lower)
utility, and they become less (more) concerned about future losses. Consequently,
winning (losing) stocks are perceived as less (more) risky, and this translates into lower
(higher) discount rates. Assuming firms are virtually identical in all respects except their
perceived risk, higher or lower discount rates represent stock price divergence from
fundamental values.
To summarize, consistency of firms' financial performance measures in the past
affects the formation and revision of investor expectations about firms' future
performance prospects. Stocks prices of firms with consistently high (low) past
performance are likely to rise above (below) their fundamentals, but eventually market
prices of these stocks should converge to their fundamental values, resulting in lower

(higher) future returns. These predictions are presented in the following testable alternate
hypotheses:

Hypothesis 5: I f consistency of past sales growth influence investor expectations about

a firm's future performance prospects, stock prices offirms with consistently high (low)
past sales growth are more likely to be over-priced (under-priced), and subsequently,
these stocks should earn low (high) returns over the long term.
Hypothesis 6: If consistency of past earnings growth influence investor expectations

about a firm's future performance prospects, stock prices offirms with consistently high
(low) past earnings growth are more likely to be over-priced (under-priced), and
subsequently, these stocks should earn low (high) returns over the long term.
Hypothesis 7:

If consistency

of past cash flow growth influence investor expectations

about a firm's future performance prospects, stock prices offirms with consistently high
(low) past cash flow growth are more likely to be over-priced (under-priced), and
subsequently, these stocks should earn low (high) returns over the long term.
Hypothesis 8:

If consistency ofpast market returns influence investor expectations about

a firm 'sfuture performance prospects, stock prices offirms with consistently high (low)
past returns are more likely to be over-priced (under-priced), and subsequently, these
stocks should earn low (high) returns over the long term.

3.2.3 The Interaction between Consistency of Firms' Past Performance Variables and
its Measurement Horizons
Daniel et al. (1998) argue that investors are overconfident in their abilities and
skills to identify winning stocks. They further assert this overconfidence bias becomes
more severe in challenging tasks that involve high uncertainty such as forecasting future
cash flows. Accordingly, this bias leads to a market over-reaction, particularly in stocks

that are difficult to value such as those achieving consistently high (low) growth over
sufficiently long periods. Their theory further predicts that, due to self-attribution bias,
investors adjust their prior beliefs in a biased fashion. Favorable outcomes confirming
investor prior beliefs significantly increase their overconfidence; adverse outcomes, on
the other hand, have little or no effect on their self-confidence in their abilities. As a
consequence, high (low) firm past performance measures should spark an initial market
over-reaction, resulting in stock price divergence from fundamental values. This initial
over-reaction will be followed by further over-reaction only as long as future outcomes
confirm investor prior beliefs, causing stock prices to continue their drift away from their
fundamental values. Eventually, market prices will revert to those fundamentals. Stocks
with high (low) past realizations over longer horizons are more likely to exhibit stronger
price momentum and subsequent reversals.
Empirical studies investigating the returns to momentum trading strategies (e.g.,
Jegadeesh and Titman [1993, 200 11, Lee and Swaminathan [2000], Moskowitz and
Grinblatt [1999], Grundy and Martin [2001], and Grinblatt and Moskowitz 120041)
provide evidence that is consistent with the prediction of the behavioral theories (e.g.,
Daniel et al. [1998]). These studies find price momentum and subsequent reversal effects
are strongly related to the magnitude of firms' past performance measures and their
formation horizons. For example, Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004) find that consistency
in past performance is a significant determinant of expected cross-sectional returns,
particularly in winning stocks. They show that consistent winners outperform other
stocks across all formation horizons and other consistent winner stocks with comparable
past returns, but for shorter periods. Lee and Swaminathan (2000) find the magnitude of

momentum gains and subsequent reversals are strongly associated with the length of the
formation periods.
The theory of Barberis et al. (1998) posits that investors, influenced by their
representativeness heuristic bias, over-react to firms with consistent past earnings
changes drifting in one direction. Observing these earnings patterns over sufficiently long
periods, investors are more likely to believe that past firms' earnings behavior is
representative of firms' future earnings prospects. In experimental settings using two
groups of MBA students, Bloomfield and Hales (2002) test the predictions of Barberis et
al.'s model. The results of their experiment indicate that investors are more likely to overreact to a recent earnings change unless the reversal rate of past earning changes is
significantly high.
Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) and Barberis and Huang (2001) propose
investor learning models in which patterns of historical financial measures interact with
firms' discount rates by influencing investors' perceptions about firms' risk exposures. In
this model, a series of high (low) realized past financial variables over longer periods is
indicative of a lower (higher) risk factor. Barberis et al.'s (2001) model is based on two
concepts: the loss aversion theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), and the house money
theory (Thaler and Johnson 1990). According to the loss aversion theory, people view the
utility of wealth as a function of temporal changes (gains and losses) in wealth rather than
the absolute level of wealth. As well, individuals exhibit greater sensitivity to losses than
to gains. The house money .theory holds that the impact of losses on individuals'
decisions depends on whether a current loss follows prior gains or losses. A loss
subsequent to a series of gains has less of an effect compared to a loss .that follows a

string of similar losses. Thaler and Johnson (1990) provide evidence that gamblers tend
to be more risk tolerant after gains and more risk averse after losses.
Barberis and Huang (2001) propose a model based on loss aversion and mental
accounting (Thaler, 1985). They argue that discount rates are a function of firms'
historical financial performance. Consistently winning firms over longer horizons are
perceived to be less risky than their consistent loser counterparts; as a consequence,
future cash flows of consistent winners (losers) are discounted at lower (higher) rates.
This leads to market prices for consistently winning (losing) stocks that diverge further
from their fundamental values, but eventually, stock prices will revert to their
fbndamentals. This results in price momentum and subsequent reversals over long
horizons.
In short, the interaction between consistency of firms' historical performance and
the formation periods over which past performance is measured are likely to affect
investor expectations about firms' future performance prospects (e.g., Daniel et al.
[1998]). The magnitude of price momentum and long-run reversals following high (low)
past financial performance is expected to be a function of these patterns and formation
horizons. In other words, firms with consistently high (low) historical financial
performance measured over longer horizons are more likely to have stronger market
momentum and reversal effects compared to those wit11 similar past measures, but for
shorter periods. Thus, the following hypotheses are posited in their alternate forms:

Hypothesis 9: Ifthe interaction between consistency offirms 'past sales growth and their
measurement intervals influences investor expectations about firms 'future performance
prospects, stocks of firms consistently achieving high (low) sales growth over a longer

period will be signzficantly over-priced (under-priced), and subsequently, these stocks
will earn lower (higher) returns relative to stocks offirms with high (low) past sales
growth, but for a shorter horizon.
Hypothesis 10: If the interaction between consistency ofjirms ' past earnings growth and
their measurement intervals influences investor expectations about firms' future
performance prospects, stocks ofjirms consistently achieving high (low) earnings growth
over a longer period will be signijicantly over-priced (under-priced), and subsequently,
these stocks will earn lower (higher) returns relative to stocks ofjirms with high (low)
past earnings growth, but for a shorter horizon.
Hypothesis 11: Ifthe interaction between consistency offirms 'past cash flow growth and
their measurement intervals influences investor expectations about firms' future
performance prospects, stocks of firms consistently achieving high (low) cash flow
growth over a longer period will be signzficantly over-priced (under-priced), and
subsequently, these stocks will earn lower (higher) returns relative to stocks ofjirms with
high (low)past cashJlow growth, but for a shorter horizon.
Hypothesis 12:

If the interaction between

consistency of Jirms ' past stock returns and

their measurement intervals influences investor expectations about firms' future
performance prospects, stocks of j r m s consistently achieving high (low) stock returns
over a longer period will be significantly over-priced (under-priced), and subsequently,
these stocks will earn lower (higher) returns relative to stocks offirms with high (low)
stock returns, but for a shorter horizon.

3.2.4 The Relation between Price Momentum and Long-term Reversal Effects
Studies that examine the behavior of stock returns following high (low) realized
past returns document that past winners continue to outperform past losers over the
ensuing twelve months following the formation period. After the first year, however,
losing stocks earn higher returns than winning stocks. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) find

stock prices of both winners and losers continue to drift over the next 12 months, but
more than half of the momentum gains are dissipated over the second and third years
following the portfolio formation. Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) extend their previous
analysis to 1998 using a holding period of 60 months after the formation date and report
similar evidence. For instance, they report the momentum monthly return is negative, on
average, for Month 13 through Month 60.
The findings of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 2001) are confirmed by other
studies. For instance, Lee and Swaminathan (2000) provide evidence that past winning
stocks continue to earn higher returns over three-to-twelve months but over three to five
years past winners (losers) become future losers (winners). By the end of year five, the
momentum gains over the first twelve months have been almost completely offset by
stock return reversals during the last two years of the holding period. They argue that
prior studies that use shorter holding horizons (up to three years) have not captured these
patterns of market momentum and subsequent reversals. They argue their findings
strongly refute the commonly held belief that market price momentum and subsequent
reversals are distinct and independent phenomena, rather they are a result of investor
over-reaction to historical performance measures that subsequently revert to their
fundamental values as investors realize their prior expectations were false.
The evidence provided by Lee and Swaminathan (2000) and Jegadeesh and
Titman (2001) is consistent with the prediction of Daniel et al. (1998) that market
momentum and reversal effects are manifestations of investor reaction. However, other
recent studies (e.g., Grinblatt and Moskowitz [2004] and Chan [2003]) argue that their
evidence lends support to the prevailing point of view, which maintains that new

information is reflected in stock prices on a gradual basis. Grinblatt and Moskowitz
(2004), for example, argue that price continuations and long-run reversals appear to be
driven by different and independent forces. Given this conflicting evidence, it is
important to investigate whether the profitability of market momentum and subsequent
return reversals are manifestations of a market over-reaction as suggested by behavioral
models (e.g., Daniel et al. [1998]) and by empirical evidence (e.g., Lee and Swaminathan
[2000], and Jegadeesh and Titman [2001]).
Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) argue that if a market under-reacts, then new
information will be gradually incorporated into stock market prices. But once this
information is completely reflected in stock prices, expected stock returns cannot be
predicted thereafter. They further argue that returns to momentum trading strategies
based on realized past returns after the first twelve months should be zero. The
momentum return following high (low) past financial performance will be eliminated
over time by return reversals (Daniel et al. 1998). Therefore, if firms' price momentum
following a period of remarkably high (low) past realizations is a product of investor
over-reaction to outstanding past performance, the momentum returns and subsequent
reversals are more likely to be negatively related but comparable in their magnitude. To
test this prediction, the following hypotheses are stated in their alternate forms.

Hypothesis 13:

If the documented

market momentum and long-horizon reversal effects

are manifestations of a market over-reaction to patterns of high (low) past sales growth,
momentum returns to a firm with higher (lower: falling or possibly negative) past sales
growth will be offset by subsequent long-run return reversals following the momentum
horizon.

Hypothesis 14: I f the documented market momentum and long-horizon reversal effects

are manifestations of a market over-reaction to patterns of high (low) past earnings
growth, momentum returns to a firm with higher (lower: falling or possibly negative)
past earnings growth will be offset by subsequent long-run return reversals following the
momentum horizon.
Hypothesis 15: If the documented market momentum and long-horizon reversal effects

are manifestations of a market over-reaction to patterns of high (low) past cash flow
growth, momentum returns to a firm with higher (lower:falling or possibly negative) past
cash flow growth will be offset by subsequent long-run return reversals following the
momentum horizon.
Hypothesis 16: I f the documented market momentum and long-horizon reversal effects

are manifestations of a market over-reaction to patterns of high (low) past stock returns,
momentum returns to a firm with higher (lower:falling or possibly negative) past returns
will be offset by subsequent long-run return reversals following the momentum horizon.

CHAPTER IV
Performance Variables and Sample

4.1 Firm Performance Variables
The theoretical work linking the relationships between a firm's past financial
performance measures and its future stock returns to investor psychology have neither
identified past financial variables likely to facilitate a market over-reaction nor
determined the length of time required to trigger such an over-reaction. However,
empirical studies investigating these outcomes use several measures of past performance.

For example, DeBondt and Thaler (1985) used historical stock returns over the prior five
years to classify a sample of firms as winners or losers. Lakonishok et al. (1994) classify
their sample into growth and value firms based on their performance over the last five
years as measured by earnings-to-price ratios, cash flow-to-price ratios, and sales growth.
Chan et al. (2004) use changes in sales, and changes in net income and operating income
to measure growth in past financial performance over two time periods (five years using
annual data and one year using quarterly data).

4.2 Variable Measurements
For this study, a firm's past financial performance is measured as changes in each
of the following variables: sales, earnings, cash flow, and stock returns. Chan et al.
(2004).suggest that sales may have little or no relation to a firm's profitability. If a firm's
profitability is a significant driving factor of investors' decisions, earnings could be a
better measure to capture investor expectations. Two measures of earnings are used in
this study: operating earnings after depreciation and amortization expense (OE) and
earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations (EB). Some may argue
that even earnings may not be a good measure for a firm's profitability since it includes
non-cash flow items. If investors discount non-cash flow amounts in their investment
decision-making processes, cash flow might be a more appropriate measure than earnings
to assess a firm's value. To measure a firm's cash flow, two metrics that have been used
extensively in the finance and accounting literatures will be used for this study. The first
is earnings before extraordinary items and discoi~tinuedoperation plus deprecation (CF),
which is cash flow as defined in the finance literature. The second is operating cash flow

adjusted for depreciation and working capital accruals (ACF), which is cash flow as
measured in the accounting literature. Desai, Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam (2004) argue
that cash flow (i.e., earnings plus depreciation) is inadequate because it does not take into
account other significant accrual items that affect a firm's operating cash flow such as
working capital accruals. They further argue that a measure of operating cash flows
including earnings adjusted for depreciation

working capital accruals is a more

comprehensive measure of a firm's operating cash flow.
All firms on the COMPUSTAT annual files with data available on these measures
for the period 1983-1999 are used to calculate prior growth in these performance
variables over varying time intervals.1° Past growth rates in sales, earnings, and cash
flow are computed by tracking per share year-to-year changes in these variables scaled by
the average per share lagged values in the prior two years for each measure. Then the
geometric means for each measure is computed over the time interval comprising the
measurement horizon." For example, the annual growth rate in sales per share for firm j
over the last five years prior to portfolio formation horizon is computed as follows:

where SGjt is the annual geometric mean of growth rate in sales per share for firm j over
the estimation intervals, ranging from one to five years relative to portfolio formation
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Summary statistics of firms with available data on past performance measures are presented in Table 1,
Panel A.
I ' Growth rates for each measure are winsorized to the 99.5 percent and 0.5 percent values to mitigate the
influence of outlier observations.

date t, ASPSj, is year-to-year changes in sales per share (SPS) for firm j in year z scaled
by the average SPS lagged values in the prior two years, where z ranges from -5 to -1.
The same procedure is followed to calculate annual growth rates in earnings and
cash flows over various formation periods.'2 Because some firms report negative earnings
and negative cash flow, growth rates in these variables may not produce meaningful
performance metrics. To overcome this problem, Chan et al. (2004) scaled changes per
share in net income and operating income by assets per share for the base period.
However, using assets as deflators may significantly reduce the informativeness of these
measures if investors simply compare financial growth rates in these variables across
time without considering contemporaneous growth rates in assets (Chan et al., 2003). To
avoid this potential problem, the absolute value of the average earnings and cash flow per
shares are used as deflators.I3
In addition, past stock returns are used as a measure of a firm's historical financial
performance. Numerous empirical studies (e.g., DeBondt and Thaler [1985, 19871,
Jegadeesh and Titman [1993, 20011, Lee and Swaminathan [2000], Grundy and Martin
[2001], and Grinblatt and Moskowitz [2004]) find realized past stock returns predict
subsequent stock market returns. However, none of these studies examine whether
patterns of the behavior of past price movement over a longer horizon has an impact on
future stock returns. Thus, past stock return is included as a measure of a firm's historical
performance. The annual stock return over a range of estimation intervals from one to

The computation of annual growth rates in these performance variables is illustrated in Appendix A.
Due to extremely rare but substantially large increases or decreases in EPS before extraordinary items
(EB), the annual growth in this measure is deleted if it is greater than 6 in absolute value and EPS for the
current and prior one period, (i.e., EPSt and EPSt-I), have opposite signs. This procedure is to mitigate the
impact of this statistical noise on the computation of EBG. This method is similar to that used in Morck et
al. [1999].
I*

l3

five years prior to portfolio formation date is calculated as the geometric average monthly
returns for 12-month periods.

4.3 Growth and Consistency in Past Firm Performance Measures
4.3.1 Growth in Past Firm Performance Measures
A procedure similar to that used by Chan et al. (2004) is used to determine growth
in annual performance measures. Each year at the end of December, firms are sorted by
their past growth rates on each performance variable. On the basis of this ranking, firms
are assigned into deciles (P 1-P 10). P 10 includes the 10 percent of firms with the highest
growth rate, and P1 contains the 10 percent of firms with the lowest growth rate. Firms
in the top deciles (P10) are classified as "high-growth firms" and firms in the bottom
deciles (PI) are called "low-growth firms."

4.3.2 Consistency in Past Firm Performance Measures
Consistency in a firm's past financial performance is defined as the number of
years in which the firm maintains annual growth rates that will place it in the top
(bottom) 40 percent for a given performance measure compared to other firms available
in the respective year. This method is similar to that used in Chan et al. (2004). Each
year at the end of December, firms are sorted independently by growth rates in their
performance over the previous one to four years.'4 o n the basis of this sorting, firms are
assigned to 3 growth groups (top 40 percent, middle 20 percent, and bottom 40 percent).
'"here

were not enough observations for the 5-year-estimation interval.

The top 40 percent of firms wit11 the highest growth rate are referred to as high growth
firms and the bottom 40 percent of firms with the lowest growth rate are referred to as the
low growth firms.
Firms in the high-growth group that rank in the top 40 percent each year for all
years included in a single estimation interval are defined as "consistent high-growth

firms.

"

Alternatively, firms in this category that fail to meet these criteria are deemed

"inconsistent high-growth firms.

"

Similarly, firms in the low growth group that

consistently rank in the bottom 40 percent each year for the entire estimation period are
classified as "consistent low-growth jrms.

"

Firms in low growth firms failing to satisfy

consistency rules are deemed "inconsistent low-growth Jirms.

"

To assess the effect of

consistency of past financial growth on investors' expectations, firms in the highest and
lowest one-year-40 percent are used as benchmarks.

4.4 Data Sources
The sample used in this study consists of all firms publicly traded on the NYSE,
AMEX, and NASDAQ exchanges over from 1983 to 1999 that have available data on the
COMPUSTAT annual file and CRSP database. For a firm to be included, it must have
sufficient data to calculate growth rates in at least one measure of variables used in this
study (e.g., sales, earnings, cash flow, and past stock returns) during various estimation
intervals varying from one to five years prior to portfolio formation. Because portfolios
considered in this study have estimation intervals ranging from one to five years prior to
formation horizon, the first holding periods begins in January 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987,
and 1988 for these measurement intervals. As well, the empirical tests require future

stock returns for five years following portfolio formation. Therefore, January 1999 is the
last formation horizon for all portfolios.
Past sales growth (SG) is measured as annual growth in sales (Compustat item
#12). Operating earnings (Compustat item # 13) minus depreciation and amortization
expense (Compustat item #14) and earnings before extraordinary and discontinued
operations (Compustat item #18) are used to measure past operating earnings growth
rates (OEG) and growth rates in earnings before extraordinary items (EBG), respectively.
Historical cash flow growth rates (CFG) as defined in the finance literature are computed
using earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations (Compustat item
# 18) plus depreciation and amortization expense (Compustat item # 14). Similarly,

earnings before extraordinary items adjusted for working capital accruals and
depreciation and amortization expense is employed to calculate cash flow growth rates
(ACFG) as defined in the accounting literature.
As in Sloan (1996) and Desai et al. (2004), working capital accruals are computed
using change in current assets (Compustat item #4), change in cash and cash equivalents
(Compustat item #I), change in short-term liabilities (Compustat item # 5 ) , change in debt
included in short-term liabilities (Compustat item #34), change in income taxes payable
(Compustat item #7 I), and depreciation and amortization expense (Compustat item #14).
Accruals are divided by average total assets (Compustat item #6).15 Annual past stock
returns (PRET) are computed using monthly stock prices over various estimation
horizons ranging from one to five years prior to portfolio formation date.

I5

Data required for calculating accruals are not available for banks, insurance companies, and most
financial firms (e.g., Sloan [I9961 and Desai et al. [2004]); thus, these firms are deleted.

The book-to market ratio (BIM) is calculated as the ratio of book value of equity
capital (Compustat item #60) to the market value of equity capital at the fiscal year-end
prior to portfolio formation date. Market value of equity is the number of comnlon share
outstanding multiplied by stock prices at the fiscal year-end before portfolios are formed.
Monthly stock prices, returns, and shares outstanding are extracted from the Center for
Research in Security and Prices (CRSP) database. As in similar research, (e.g.,
Lakonishok et al. [I9941 and Lee and Swaminathan [2000]), stocks with market prices
below $1 at portfolio formation date are eliminated.16

CHAPTER V
Empirical Test Design

The hypotheses posited in this study predict that performance growth and its
persistence over time (consistency) represent patterns of past financial variables that are
most likely to lead to a market over-reaction. As a result, stock prices of firms with
relatively high (low) performance in the past are expected to be pushed above (below)
their fundamental values. Eventually, however, share prices of these firms will return to
their fundamental values. This stock price behavior is consistent with empirical research
on market momentum and subsequent reversal effects. This study predicts that the
interaction between patterns of past performance variables and their measurement
horizons influence investor expectations. Specifically, return momentum and subsequent
l6

Stocks whose market prices are greater than $500 at the portfolio formation date are also deleted.

reversals are more likely to be stronger among firms consistently performing well
(poorly) over a longer period of time. Finally, consistent with recent theoretical and
empirical work, the last set of hypotheses posed in this thesis argues that the documented
price continuation and long-run price reversals are a manifestation of a market overreaction. Various portfolio tests, including individual stock and hedge portfolios, are used
to test these sets of hypotheses. Regression analyses are used, in which a firm's annual
returns are regressed against its past performance variables after controlling for potential
confounding factors. In the following sections, the implementation of these tests is
described.

5.1 Portfolio Tests

The sets of hypotheses posited in this study argue that if investors over-react to
past performance measures, patterns (growth and consistency in growth) of growth rates
in these variables should be informative ex ante about future investor behavior.
Accordingly, firms achieving relatively strong (weak) financial performance in the past
are more likely to be perceived by investors as growing (declining) firms. As a
consequence, stocks of these firms become over-priced (under-priced) and this
mispricing is expected to continue to drift until adverse (favorable) information about
firms' future performance become known to market participants. As investors receive
more information refuting their prior expectations, stock prices move toward their
fundamental values.
Therefore, it is important to examine the behavior of stock returns over longer
horizons following portfolio formation to determine whether this behavior is consistent

with the hypothesis that investor expectations are biased. From previous empirical
studies, it can be argued that the period of study must be long enough to capture the
process of over-reaction and correction phases (e.g., Lee and Swaniinathan [2000] and
Jegadeesh and Titman [1993,2001]).
To facilitate such an examination, various equally weighted portfolios are formed
following each pattern of firms' historical performance. These portfolios are held without
rebalancing for five years after the formation date and their post-formation returns are
calculated each year (years 1 through 5) as the geometric mean monthly returns. Portfolio
formation and procedures used to measure their returns are described below.
To test the sets of hypotheses advanced in this study, firms are grouped into ten
decile portfolios (PI-PI 0) each year at .the end of December based on the ranking rules
described in Chapter 4. The top ten percent of firms with the highest growth rates are
included in P10 and the bottom ten percent of firms with the lowest growth rates are
assigned to PI. Next, trading strategies are applied whereby stocks of firms in the lowest
growth decile (PI) are bought, and stocks of firms in the highest growth decile (P10) are
sold. These strategies are applied for each performance measure. These portfolios are
referred to as "growth portfolios" and their returns as "PI-P10." The predictions of H1-

H4 are supported if PI-P10 is significantly greater than zero, particularly in years 2
through 3 of the holding period.'7
To test H5-H8, consistency in growth rates of firms' historical performance
measures (sales, earnings, cash flow, and stock returns) is used to construct a portfolio
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The extant literature (e.g., Jegadeesh and Titman [1993, 20011) suggests that following relatively high
(low) financial performance, stock prices continue to drift in the same direction for the next twelve months,
but this momentum reverses over the long term.

that takes a long position in consistent low-growth firms and a short position in consistent
high-growth firms. These trading strategies are called "consistent-growth portfolios" and
their returns are "CLG-CHG." The predictions of H5-H8 are supported if CLG-CHG is
significantly greater than zero. Analogously, hypotheses H9-H12 are supported if
consistent-growth portfolios with longer formation intervals, i.e., two to four years, earn
significantly greater returns compared to benchmark portfolios. To test the predictions
posited by H 13-H 16, returns of growth portfolio (P 1-P 10) in the first post-formation year
are compared to its returns in years 2 through 5 of the holding period. H13-H16 are
supported if the one-year-ahead return to the PI-PI0 is offset by subsequent price
reversals over the remainder of the investment horizons in year two through year five.
All portfolios are held without rebalancing for five years after the formation date.
If a firm's stock returns are missing from the CRSP database during a given year, the
average return of the size-decile portfolio to which the firm belongs at the formation date
is substituted for the firm's stock returns until the end of the year. The annual returns and
size-adjusted abnormal returns (SAR) for years 1 through 5 are calculated as the
geometric average monthly returns for five 12-month periods after the portfolio
formation horizon. SAR is defined as the return for firm j minus the average return of the
size decile portfolio to which firm j belongs at the beginning of the holding period. In
calculating annual returns and SAR, each year is treated as one observation to avoid
potential serial correlation in stock returns caused by overlapping holding horizons. The
mean returns and mean-size-adjusted abnormal returns for each portfolio are averaged
over the test period and t-tests are performed as in Fama-MacBeth (1973).

To construct the size decile portfolios, all sample firms are ranked by size as
measured by market capitalizations at the year-end of the fiscal year before portfolios are
formed. Second, firms are assigned to ten size decile portfolios (P 1-P 1O), where P 10 and
P1 contain firms in the top and bottom deciles of market capitalizations, respectively. If a
firm disappears in a given period, the average return of the size decile portfolio to which
the firm belongs is substituted for its returns until the end of the year, as in Lakonishok et
al. (1994).

5.2 Regression Tests
The psychology-based theories reviewed in Chapter 3 suggests that patterns of a
firm's past performance measures are significant driving factors behind the documented
relation between expected returns and past performance variables. To investigate the
marginal impact of these patterns on future stock returns, the following multiple crosssectional regressions in which the independent variable is the past performance measure
are run. In each regression, the size-adjusted abnormal return (SAR) for each firm is
regressed against its past performance measures after controlling for its market beta and

BIM ratio for each post-formation year (years 1 through 5).18

where SARjTis the annual size-adjusted abnormal return for firm j for each year (years 1
through 5) subsequent to the portfolio formation (z = 1, 2, . . .5).

18

Qjt

is the appropriate past

Growth rates in performance variables are highly related, particularly, earnings and cash flow; thus, they
are considered individually to avoid potential multicollinearity (e.g., Lakonishok et al. [1994]).

financial performance measure (growth in sales, earnings, cash flow, or past stock
returns), BetajT-lis the market beta for firm j computed using monthly returns for the prior
60 months (with a minimum of 36 months) ending in December of year z-1. Ln(Size, ,-,)
is the natural log of market value for equity of firm j at the end of December of year z-1,
and B/MjT-,is the book value of equity divided by firm size at the end of the fiscal year
z-1. Although SAR is used as the dependent variable in the regression approach, size
ranks are included in the multiple regressions to avoid biased coefficients on past
performance measures (e.g., Bernard [1987], Foster et al. [1984], and Desai et al. [2004]).
The regression analyses assume linearity in the relation between the dependent
and explanatory variables; this may not hold. Thus, the analyses may fail to capture the
extent of the relation between a firm's past performance measures and its expected
subsequent stock returns. To mitigate this problem, Bernard and Thomas (1990), Frankel
and Lee (1998), Zhou (2002), and Desai et al. (2004) used scaled rankings of all
independent variables. They argue that scaled rankings reduce the influence of outliers
and alleviate the possibility of nonlinearity between the dependent and independent
variables. As in Bernard and Thomas (1 990), Dechow and Sloan (1997), Frankel and Lee
(1998), Zhou (2002), and Desai et al. (2004) all independent variables are sorted in ten
deciles (0-9) in descending order. Each decile is scaled to a value of 0 (for the lowest
decile) or 1 (for the highest decile).
If patterns of a firm's past financial performance influence investor perceptions
about its future prospects, its stock price may continue to move in .the same direction
indicated by its past performance measures over the first year after portfolio formation.
Over a longer horizon (perhaps three to five years), however, stock prices should revert to

their fundamental values as investors are disappointed (surprised) by the actual
performance of the firm. Thus, the coefficient

PI of 0, (past performance measures) might

be positive and significant in the first post-formation year but negative and significant
thereafter, particularly in years 3 through 5. For each of the five post-formation years, the
coefficients from these cross-sectional regressions of stock returns are averaged over the
sample period and t-statistics are calculated from the time-series variations of these
regression coefficients as in Fama-MacBeth (1973).
Daniel et al. (1998) and Lee and Swaminathan (2000) argue that the profitability
of market momentum is a manifestation of a market over-reaction to the historical
behavior of a firm's financial performance that eventually dissipates when its market
price reverts to its fundamental value over the long run. This theoretical framework
suggests that the behavior of stock prices during the momentum and reversal horizons is
diametrically opposed to each other. To assess the association between the intermediate
price continuation and the subsequent price reversal over longer time horizons, the crosssectional regression (Eq. 1) is re-run including a firm's size-adjusted abnormal return
(SARI) for the first post-formation year (the momentum return) as an independent
variable. The dependent variable is the size-adjusted abnormal return (SAR) for firm j
after the first twelve month of the holding period, starting with year 2 and ending with
year 5.

where SAR,, is the annual size-adjusted abnormal return for firm j in years 2 through 5
following the formation date. SARjl is the one-year-ahead abnormal return for firm j after

portfolio formation horizon, and the remainders of the variables are as defined
previously. If the momentum profit is due to market over-reaction, the coefficient for
SAR,, is expected to be significantly less than zero.

CHAPTER VI
Empirical Results

6.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 includes summary statistics of portfolio sample sizes and correlations
among the variables. Firms with sufficient data on the Compustat annual files and CRSP
to calculate growth rates in sales, earnings, cash flow, past stock returns are reported in
Panel A. As shown in Panel A, the sample includes roughly equal observations for all
measures across estimation intervals with the exception of ACFG, which has slightly
fewer firms (firms with insufficient data to calculate working capital accruals, such as
banks, insurance companies, and most financial firms were excluded as in Sloan (1996)).
The average correlation coefficients among performance variables, market betas
(Betas), book-to-market ratio (BIM), and market capitalizations (Size) are reported in
Panel B, where Spearman (Pearson) correlations are in the upper (lower) diagonal. All
performance measures are positively related suggesting that growth rates in these
variables tend to move in the same direction. For example, OEG is highly correlated with
EBG and CFG (Spearman correlations

=

0.91, p < 0.0001, and 0.88, p < 0.0002,

respectively). CFG is highly correlated with ACFG (Spearman correlation

=

0.87, p

=

0.0003). Past performance variables exhibit positive associations with Size indicating that
large firms have relatively higher past growth rates compared to their smaller
counterparts. Finally, the correlations between growth in past performance measures and
Betas and B/M ratios are negative although none of these coefficients are statistically
significant except for PRET.

[Table 11
Descriptive statistics of firms in the top (bottom) growth decile portfolios (i.e.,
PI0 (P 1)) as well as all firms across the ten growth deciles for each performance measure
appear in Panels A through C of Table 2 by estimation intervals of performance
variables.19 Generally, with the exception of firms sorted based on SG and to some
degree firms ranked by their PRET, firms in the highest (lowest) growth decile portfolios,
P10 (PI) are typically smaller firms with relatively larger Betas compared to total firms.
However, firms in the bottom growth portfolios (Pl) tend to have slightly higher B/M
ratios and are smaller relative to firms in the top growth deciles (PIO). The dispersion in
market capitalizations becomes more pronounced as the estimation interval increases.

[Table 21

Summary statistics of firms sorted by consistency in their growth rates are shown
in Table 3.20 Table 3 shows the number of observations between low-growth and highgrowth groups is approximately equal, particularly for the first two years of prior data
(Panels A and B). Afterward, however, the low-growth group tends to have smaller
19

20

Unreported statistics for firms in the 2ndand 4thestimation intervals exhibit similar patterns
Unreported statistics for firms in the 3'd estimation interval show similar patterns.

numbers of observations relative to their high-growth firm counterpart. This might be due
to the fact that firms consistently ranking in the lowest 4.0 percent for a longer horizon are
likely to be de-listed or acquired by other firms. In general, with the exception of firms
sorted by SG and PRET, both consistent high-growth firms and consistent-low-growth
firms are relatively small firms and both groups are comparable in terms of market
values.

[Table 31

6.2 Portfolio Test Results
6.2.1 Growth Portfolios
In this subsection, results for various growth portfolios formed based on past
growth rates in sales, earnings, cash flow, and returns are reported. For all growth
metrics, only results for top (P10) and bottom (PI) portfolios, and their return
differentials, i.e., PI-P10, are reported in Tables 4 through 9.2' Tables 4 through 9 include
annual returns and size-adjusted abnormal returns along with estimation periods. Treating
each post-formation year as an independent observation to avoid potential serial
correlation, five annual returns (R1 through R5) and size-adjusted abnormal returns
(SARI through SAR5) for each estimation period are calculated. As well, the arithmetic
average annual returns (AR) and average size-adjusted abnormal returns (ASAR) over
the test period (years 1 through 5) are calculated to facilitate comparison with prior
studies (e.g., Lakonishok et al. [1994]).

-

21

Unreported performance based on the 2"d and 31d estimation intervals reveals similar patterns to reported
results.

Results from growth portfolios based on SG are reported in Table 4. The results
indicate that low growth firms (PI) earn relatively higher returns compared to high
growth firm portfolios (PI O), particularly for the first two years after portfolio formation
date. For example, the spread for returns between the top and bottom portfolios, that is,
P 1-P10, for the first-postformation year is 5.29 percent for five-year growth rates in sales
(Panel C under the Year 1/R1 column) and 10.33 percent for the last three year estimation
period (Panel B under the Year 1IR1 column). The average returns for P 1-P 10, however,
over the holding period are not different from zero beyond the third estimation interval.
For instance, as shown in Panel C, Table 4 under the AverageIAR column, the PI -PI0
average return for the five-year formation period is 0.71 percent (t = 0.65). This finding is
inconsistent with that of Lakonishok et al. (1994), who report an average return of 6.8
percent per year for the P 1-P 10 portfolio in their sample.

[Table 41
The difference between the results reported in this thesis and those of Lakonishok
et al. (1994) might be attributed to the following reasons: Lakonishok et al.'s study uses
only NYSE and AMEX from 1968 to 1990 while my sample includes NASDAQ firms as
well during the 1987 to 1999 time interval. Desai et al. (2004), include NASDAQ firms
in their sample, and obtain a return gap between value and growth of 10.2, 0.20, and 0.80
percent, for one-, two-, and three-years ahead, respectively. Their results suggest that the
effect of past sales growth completely disappears after the first year.
Returns to portfolios sorted on the basis of past growth rates in OEG are presented
in Table 5. Regardless of the formation intervals, based on the average annual returns
over the 5 year holding periods, firms in the bottom growth decile (PI) substantially

outperform firms with the higher past growth rates (P10). The P1 portfolio yields an
average annual return of between 25.33 (Panel A under the AverageIAR column) and
3 1.67 percent (Panel C under the AverageIAR column) for one and five year estimation
horizons, respectively. On other hand, their cohort firms in the top growth portfolios
(P10) earn an average return ranging from 20.87 percent (Panel A under the AverageIAR
column) to 18.50 percent (Panel C under the AverageIAR column). This results in an
annual return spread between 4.46 percent (t
AverageIRA column and 13.67 percent (t

=

=

4.10) as shown in Panel A under the

5.33) as shown in Panel C under the

AverageIAR column. As well, the results reported in Table 5 show that the difference in
returns between the top and bottom growth portfolios increases uniformly as more years
of past performance data are included in the analysis.
[Table 51
For PI-P10, the portfolio going long (short) in stocks ranking lowest (highest) in
earnings growth rates over the prior five years, an average abnormal return of 8.38
percent (t

=

5.07) per year over the five-year holding horizon is observed (see Panel C

under the AverageIASAR column). This finding contradicts that of Chan et al. (2004),
who show no evidence of return reversal over the next 36-months after the formation
period. However, this result is consistent with that reported in Lakonishok et al. (1994).
For the one-year estimation interval, the high-growth portfolio (P 10) outperforms
the low-growth portfolio (PI) by a return of 6.40 percent (t

=

1.85) and size-adjusted

abnormal return of 7.26 percent (t = 2.33) in the first post-formation year (see panel A of
Table 5 under the Year 11R1 and SARl columns, respectively). This evidence is
consistent with the presence of a "jinancial momentum" effect. This effect seems to

persist even in portfolios formed based on longer estimation intervals, but its strength and
persistence dissipates quickly as more years of data are included in the formation interval.
For example, the first year return to the PI-PI0 portfolio for two through five year
estimation horizons is always positive. However, the existence of financial momentum
can be inferred from the smaller magnitude of first year return to the P 1-P 10 portfolio
compared to its returns in years 2 through 5 for all estimation intervals graphically
presented in Figure 1. As well, the size-adjusted abnormal returns exhibit similar
patterns.

[Figure 11
The results reported in Table 5 show returns of -6.40 percent (t = -1.85) and -7.26
percent (t

=

-2.33) for raw and size-adjusted returns (see Panel A under the Year 1/R1

and SARl columns), respectively, for the portfolio that buys (sells) stocks of firms
ranking lowest (highest) in past operating earnings growth rates in the year preceding the
portfolio formation date. This indicates a stronger price drift following exceptionally high
(low) operating earnings growth than that documented by Chan et al. (2004). They find
firms with high operating income over the prior one year outperform firms in the bottom
decile, but by the end of twelve months, the return spread between high- and low-growth
stock portfolios are not significantly different from zero. They report similar evidence for
net income.
Results for firms sorted by their past growth rates in EBG over formation periods
between one and five years are presented in Table 6. On average, firms ranking lowest
(highest) in past growth rates generate average annual returns between 24.19 percent

(19.99 percent) as shown in Panel A under the AverageIAR column and 29.05 percent
(17.78 percent) as shown in Panel C under the AverageIAR column for the one and five
year estimation horizons, respectively. Returns for low (high) growth deciles exhibit the
same uniform pattern of steady increase (decrease) with the estimation durations. This
gives rise to an average annual return for the PI-PI0 portfolio varying from 4.20 percent
(t = 4.36) as shown in Panel A under the AverageIAR column to 11.27 percent (t = 7.17)
as shown in Panel C under the AverageIAR column for one and five years of past growth
in EBG, respectively. The same pattern emerges for the size-adjusted returns. This
evidence is consistent with Lakonishok et al. (1994).
[Table 61

As in Table 5, we see that firms with one-year growth rates in the top growth
decile (P10) earn substantially higher returns (6.56 percent; t

=

2.48) and size-adjusted

returns (7.24 percent; t = 2.93) than their low growth firm counterparts (Pl) in year l ( see
Panel A under the Year 11R1 and SARl columns, respectively). This evidence is
consistent with the presence of financial momentum following strong (weak) financial
performance. The PI-PI0 return behavior in the first post-formation year across all
estimation horizons reveals a price drift after relatively high (low) financial growth. This
pattern is similar to that observed in Figure 1 and for the size-adjusted abnormal returns
as well.
As discussed previously, Chan et al. (2004) document financial drift in their data,
particularly for quarterly data, but the magnitude and duration of this drift diminishes
quickly. For example, the return spread between top and bottom growth quintiles in their
sample is not different from zero at the end of the first 12 months. On the other hand, the

findings reported in this study indicate significant financial momentum effects that may
persist across all estimation periods although it dissipates quickly as more years of past
performance data are included in the measurement interval.
The results of stocks ranked according to their CFG rates over one through five
years prior to the portfolio formation date are presented in Table 7. On average, lowgrowth stocks (PI) have raw annual returns ranging from 25.46 percent for the one-year
formation period (Panel A under the AverageIAR column) to 3 1.53 percent for the fiveyear estimation horizon (Panel C under the AverageIAR column). Stocks ranking highest
in the past cash flow-growth rates (P10) generate average returns from 21.12 percent
(Panel A under the AverageIAR column) to 18.86 percent (Panel C under the
AverageIAR column) for one- and five-year measurement durations, respectively. On
average, firms ranking lowest in cash flow-growth rates outperform their cohort firms in
the highest growtli rate decile by a wide margin in all sample periods regardless of the
estimation periods, for return differentials from 4.33 percent (t

=

4.55) for the one-year

formation (Panel A under the AverageIAR column) and 12.57 percent (t

=

7.75) for the

five-year estimation period (Panel C under the AverageIAR column). This finding is
similar to that documented in prior studies (e.g., Lakonishok et al. [I9941 and Desai et al.
[2004]).

[Table 71
The difference between the top and bottom growth deciles, i.e., PI-PlO, in the
average size-adjusted returns exhibit similar patterns to the spread in raw returns but with
slightly smaller magnitude. For average size-adjusted returns, the smallest difference was
3.75 percent (t

=

3.87) for the one year formation horizon (Panel A under the

AverageIASAR column), while the largest was 9.32 percent (t

=

6.07) for the five year

formation horizon (Panel C under the AverageIASAR column).
The results in Table 7 indicate that low-growth stocks (PI) generate higher
annual raw returns and higher size-adjusted abnormal returns than their high-growth
counterparts (P10) in all years across the five formation periods except in the first postformation year for the one-year estimation interval. As with OEG and EBG, firms in the
top growth decile (P10) based on one-year CFG earn greater returns (4.98 percent; t

=

1.65) and size-adjusted returns (5.73 percent; t = 2.06), respectively than their low growth
firm counterparts (P 1) in year 1 (see Panel A under the Year 11R1 and SARl columns).
As observed in Table 5 and Table 6, the first year returns are weaker compared to that for
two- through five-year estimation periods. Once again this behavior is consistent with a
price drift effect following relatively strong (weak) accounting-based financial
performance (see Figure 1). The size-adjusted one-year return reveals a more robust drift
effect compared to the one-year raw return. This evidence is reflected in the negative
size-adjusted return to the PI-PI0 portfolio in the first post-formation year for two years
of past financial data.
The results of growth portfolios based on their past growth rates in ACFG are
reported in Table 8. On average, firms ranking lowest (PI) in ACFG earn average raw
returns ranging from 26.62 percent (Panel A under the AverageIAR column) to 32.53
percent (Panel C under the AverageIAR column) for one- and five-year estimation
periods of past cash flow growth. On the other hand, the average raw return of firms in
the top growth rate decile (P10) ranges from 21.58 percent (Panel A under the
AverageIAR column) to 18.97 percent (Panel C under the AverageIAR column). This

indicates, on average, a return gap varying from 5.03 percent (t = 5.34) as shown in Panel
A under the AverageIAR column to 12.56 percent (t = 8.26) as shown in Panel C under
the AverageIAR column. For the five-year formation interval, the returns for the P 1-PI0
portfolio are 12.09, 13.72, and 11.38 percent for post-formation years 1 through 3 (see
Panel C under the Year 1 through Year 3lR1 through R3 columns), respectively. This
compares to 14.9, 5.6, and 1.9 percent returns reported by Desai et al. (2004). On
average, the magnitude of the results reported here are about two times of those reported
in Desai et al. (2004). The size-adjusted abnormal returns reported in this thesis for the
PI-PI0 portfolio are 8.84, 11.54, and 8.50 percent (Panel C under the Year 1 through
Year 3lSARl through SAR3 columns) for the first, second, and third post-formation
years, respectively, compared to 12.6, 6.6, and 1.6 percent reported in Desai et al. (2004)
for the same periods.
Results in Table 8 reveal that firms in the bottom growth decile (PI) continue to
outperform their counterparts in the top growth decile (P10) by a wide margin after the
third year of the test horizon. For example, the returns for firms in the P1 portfolio are
14.69 and 12.00 percent greater than those for firms in the P10 portfolio in years 4 and 5,
respectively (see Panel C under the Years 4 and 5lR4 and R5 columns).
[Table 81
The results shown in Table 8 indicate that low-growth firms (PI) achieve higher
returns compared to high-growth firms (P10) for all holding horizons across the five
estimation intervals except in the first post-formation year for stocks sorted by their past
one-year growth rates. As reported in Table 8, the PI-PI0 portfolio has a raw return of
-3.58 percent (t = 1.16) and size-adjusted abnormal returns of -4.22 percent (t = 1.46) as

shown in Panel A under the Year 11R1 and SARl columns, respectively. The P 1-P 10 first
year return relative to its second year return for all estimation intervals indicates that
momentum exists across all estimation horizons (see Figure I), but it becomes weaker as
the formation period increases. The pattern observed in the raw returns of the P1 -PI0
portfolio holds for its size-adjusted returns as well.
The evidence of a price drift reported in Table 8 after exceptionally high (low)
cash flow growth suggests the presence of market momentum shown in Tables 5, 6, and
7. Further, the relatively smaller size of year 1 returns compared to that of years 2
through 5 for each formation interval, as well as its stronger impact as more periods of
past financial growth are included in the formation intervals, is suggestive of a market
price momentum effect following strong (weak) accounting-based financial measures.
The results of growth portfolios formed on the basis of past stock returns over the
preceding one through five years are displayed in Table 9. The low-growth portfolio (PI)
average returns range from 24.26 percent (Panel A under the AverageIAR column) to
30.08 percent (Panel C under the AverageIAR column) for the one- and five-year
estimation horizons, respectively, compared to 16.45 and 15.69 percent for high-growth
decile firms (PI 0). On average, the P1 -P 10 portfolio returns range from 7.28 (t = 5.59) as
shown in Panel A under the AverageIAR column to 13.81 percent (t = 5.65) as shown in
Panel C under the AverageIAR column for the same estimation horizons. For the sizeadjusted return, on average, firms in the bottom decile (PI) outperform firms in top decile
(P10) by 4.73 percent (t = 4.76) for the one-year measurement horizon (Panel A under the
AverageIASAR column) and 8.63 percent (t = 4.52) for the five-year estimation horizon
(Panel C under the AverageIASAR column).

[Table 91
For the one-year estimation period, the P1 -PI0 has a raw return of 3.04 (t = 1.04)
and a size-adjusted abnormal return of 0.1 1 percent (t = 0.05), respectively (see Panel A
under the Year 11R1 and SARl colun~ns).In unreported results, in the first postformation year, firms with the highest prior year returns outperform their counterparts
with the lowest returns in the months of February through December but not in January.
In this first year, losers earn about two third of their annual returns in January alone
compared to less than one third for their winner counterparts in this month.
Although the P 1-P 10 portfolio returns are positive, particularly its raw return, the
pattern of first year returns across all estimation periods is suggestive of a price drift (see
Figure 1). The magnitude and persistence, however, of this drift tend to dissipate as more
years of past returns are included. A similar result for size-adjusted returns in the first
post-formation year obtains.
The lack of evidence of a market price momentum effect, particularly for firms
ranked by their prior one-year returns, seems to contradict the findings of prior studies
(e.g., Jegadeesh and Titman [1993, 20011). However, this observed difference might be
due to the visibility of price momentum strategies in the investment communities over the
recent past (Jegadeesh and Titman, 2001). Such publicity would result in lessening or
eliminating its profitability potential as an investment strategy. The superior returns for
many well-known market anomalies dissipate after the publication of the original work
documenting the phenomenon. For example, the higher performance of value stocks
relative to growth stocks (Lakonishok et al. 1994) has declined in recent years and

become insignificant after the first post-formation year (see Table 2 in Desai at el.
[2004]).
A recent study by Chan et al. (2004) provides evidence of the erosion of price
momentum profitability. Sorting firms by their previous 12-month returns, they find
firms ranking highest in prior returns enjoy an annual raw return 2.40 percent (t

=

1.33)

greater than that of firms with the lowest past returns. This return is much smaller than
those returns (12.4 percent; t

=

3.07) reported in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993).

Meanwhile, Chan et al. (2004) report results that are similar to those reported here given
their longer sample time period (1976 to 2000) compared to 1983 to 1999 used in this
study.
In summary, the preceding analyses include several key findings. First, firms in
the lowest growth ranks (PI) based on their past performance significantly outperform
firms in the highest growth ranks (PIO) across all performance variables and estimation
horizons. This evidence contradicts Chan et al. (2004), but it is consistent with prior
studies in the value firms-growth firm literature (e.g., Lakonishok et al. 1994). Second,
this difference might be attributed to the longer and different sample time period (1968 to
1990) of Lakonishok et al. (1994) compared to 1983 to 1999 used in this study. Finally, it
could be due to the inclusion of NASDAQ firms in the current study while Lakonishok et
al. analyze NYSE and AMEX firms only.

Desai et al. (2004), however, include

NASDAQ firms over the period 1976 to 2000 and report evidence similar to the finding
in this study.
As well, the P 1-P 10 returns increase uniformly with the estimation intervals. That
is, the longer the measurement horizon of past performance, the stronger the P1 -PI0

returns. This behavior of the return spread between low- and high-growth portfolios is
driven by the steadily rising returns of firms in the bottom growth decile, and to a lesser
extent, by the declining returns of firms in the top decile as the pre-formation periods
increase.
In addition, for all performance measures in this study, the size-adjusted abnormal
return for high-growth firms is negative (or close to zero), and it is negatively related to
the number of years comprising the formation intervals. This evidence is consistent with
the predictions of behavioral models suggesting investors put significant emphasis on a
firm's past financial performance when projecting its future prospects (e.g., Lakonishok
et al. [1994], Daniel et al. [1998], and Barberis et al. [1998]). Firms showing relatively
strong (weak) financial performance in the past are expected to maintain such
performance in the future. This optimism (pessimism) on the part of investor leads to
stock prices that deviate significantly from their underlying values. As investors are
disappointed (surprised) by the subsequent performance of high (low) growth firms, stock
prices recover to fundamental values.
In the first post-formation year for firms sorted on the basis of their past year
accounting-based measures (except SG), strong evidence of a price drift following
exceptionally high (low) financial performance is found. During the first year after
portfolios were formed, firms in the top growth ranks tended to yield higher returns (both
raw returns and size-adjusted abnormal returns) than their counterparts in the lowest
growth ranks. The evidence is consistent with the existence of price drift after relatively
high (low) past financial growth.

Although PI-PI0 portfolio first year returns are

positive beyond the first estimation interval of past growth data, financial momentum

seems to persist even for longer formation horizons. The effects of this price drift can be
inferred from the behavior and size of the P 1-PI 0 returns in the first post-formation year
across all estimation intervals relative to the PI-PI0 returns in years 2 through 5,
although it is much weaker for SG and completely disappears after the first year of past
sales data. The magnitude and duration of this drift, however, dissipates as more years of
prior performance are included.

Apart from the post-earnings announcement drift

literature, the existing literature on market momentum is exclusively related to past price
movements. To the best of my knowledge, no other study offers evidence of financial
momentum effects for stocks sorted by their past growth rates in accounting-based
performance measures, particularly for a one-year estimation period.
Taken together, the evidence documented in this subsection supports hypotheses
H1 through H4. The average return for the P1-P10 portfolio is positive in every case and
statistically significant across all measures and formation periods. Although there is
evidence of significant financial drift in year 1 returns in all measures (except SG),
following one year of prior financial performance data, the year 2 return for the same
estimation interval is more than twice the price drift seen in year 1. Using the preceding 3
to 12 month returns to classify stocks as past winners and losers conditional on trading
volume, Lee and Swaminathan (2000) show that winners' gains in the first year after
portfolio formation are almost nullified by price reversals in years 2 through 5. This is not
the case for accounting-based measures used in this study. Thus, hypotheses H13 through
H16 are not supported. This does not mean that there is no reversal in stock prices
following their initial price drift. Rather, the long run return reversal during postformation years 2 through 5 is more than three times the momentum return in year 1.

Thus, a test that tracks the behavior of stock prices over both the estimation and test
periods might be a better way to assess the relation between these two phenomena.
Finally, firms with high stock returns in the year before the formation date earn a
size-adjusted abnormal return of 0.1 1 (t

=

0.05) percent less than firms in the bottom

return decile in the first post-formation year. The gap in raw returns between firms in the
top and bottom past return deciles is not significantly different from zero as well (3.04
percent; t

=

1.04). This lack of evidence of a price drift in raw returns is not consistent

with the price momentum literature (e.g., Jegadeesh and Titman [1993]). The difference
between results reported here and those of prior studies might be attributed to reasons
discussed earlier in this section. Chan et al. (2004) provide evidence that reconciles these
findings with the extant literature on price momentum strategies. Ranking stocks by their
past 12-month returns, they observe a strong price drift over months 3 to 9, but by the end
of 12 months the return differential between prior winners and losers becomes
statistically insignificant (2.40 percent; t = 1 .33).22

6.2.2 Consistent Growth Portfolios
The return performance for various portfolios based on consistency of past
performance in sales, earnings, cash flow, and stock returns are presented in this
subsection. At the end of December for each year in the sample period, firms are sorted
by their performance over the previous year and then assigned to three growth groups
(top 40 percent, middle 20 percent, and bottom 40 percent). The top-forty percent of

l 2 In unreported results, for portfolios formed based on one-year past return, stocks in the top decile
outperform their counterpart stocks in the bottom decile in almost every month from February to
December, but not in January.

firms with the highest growth rate are referred to as high growth firms and the bottomforty percent of firms with the lowest growth rate are identified as low growth firms.
Firms in the high-growth group consistently ranking in the top 40 percent each
year for all years included in the single estimation interval are classified as "consistent
high-growth firms" (CHG) for that estimation interval.

Similarly, firms in the low

growth group consistently ranking in the lowest 40 percent each year for all years
comprising a single estimation period are defined as "consistent low-growth firms"
(CLG). To assess how consistency in a firm's past financial performance affects
investors' expectations about its future prospects, firms sorted by their one-year growth
rates are used as benchmarks.
In Tables 10 through 15, panel A includes the return performance for the
benchmark portfolio, while returns for portfolios constructed based on consistency of past
growth rates, i.e., CHG and CLG portfolios and their return spreads (CLG-CHG) are
reported in Panel B and Panel c . The
~ ~return differentials between returns of CLG-CHG
portfolios and that of the benchmark portfolio for each estimation interval are reported in
the last row of Panel B and Panel C, i.e., CGP2-CGP1 and CGP4-CGP1. As in the
previous subsection, annual raw returns and size-adjusted abnormal returns are provided.
Five annual returns (R1 through R5) and size-adjusted abnormal returns (SARI through
SAR5) are calculated for each estimation period.24As well, average annual returns (AR)
and average size-adjusted abnormal returns (ASAR) are computed over the test period
(years 1 through 5). The last rows in Panel B and Panel C include the return spread

"

Unreported performance for portfolios based on the 31d estimation intervals show similar patterns as
those of reported results.
l4 To avoid potential autocorrelation in stock returns caused by overlapping holding periods, each year after
the formation date is considered an independent observation.

between the benchmark portfolios and that of the CLG-CHG portfolios at each respective
estimation horizon.
The return performance for firms ranked by consistency in their past SG over the
previous one through four years are presented in Table 10. These results show that, on
average, consistent low-growth firms (CLG) outperform their consistent high-growth
firm (CHG) counterparts across all estimation horizons although the return gap is
statistically significant only in the first two post-formation years. Panel B of Table 10
reveals that an incremental year of consistency of past sales growth has a slightly positive
impact on the return of CLG-CHG portfolio.

[Table 101
The return results for the various portfolios formed on the basis of consistency in
past OEG over prior periods are displayed in Table 11. Firms in the consistent lowgrowth portfolio (CLG) have an average return between 19.92 percent and 21.44 percent,
while firms in the consistent high-growth portfolio (CHG) earn between 19.23 and 17.17
percent (see Panel A and Panel C under the AverageIAR column, respectively). The
average return gap between consistent low and high-growth firms, i.e., the CLG-CHG
return, ranges from 0.30 (t
and 3.67 percent (t

=

=

0.52) as shown in Panel A under the AverageIAR column

1.56) as shown in Panel C under the AverageIAR column for one

and four years of past OEG, respectively. The average size-adjusted return exhibits a
similar pattern.
As in Table 5, firms with consistent low past growth (CLG) perform significantly
better than firms with consistent high-growth rates (CHG) in all holding periods across

all estimation horizons, except in the first year of the holding period based on a one-year
estimation horizon. Panel A, Table 11 shows that firms in the CHG portfolio outperform
firms in the CLG portfolio by 4.33 (t

=

2.67) and 4.67 percent (t

=

2.96) for annual raw

returns and size-adjusted returns, respectively (see Panel A under the Year 11R1 and
SARl columns). This evidence is consistent with effects of financial momentum after
relatively strong (weak) earning performance as shown in Table 5.
The first year return compared to the second year return for the CLG-CHG
portfolio across all the estimation horizons exhibits a price drift following an incremental
year of consistency in operating growth similar to that graphed in Figure 1. This drift
persists for longer formation horizons.
On average, the CLG-CHG portfolio outperforms the benchmark portfolio by
1.98 percent (t = 2.5 1) as shown in the last row of Panel B under the AverageIAR column
to 3.33 percent (t

=

2.98) as shown in the last row of Panel C under the AverageIAR

column for two and four estimation intervals, respectively. This return differential
increases with .the measurement horizon of past financial performance. In other words,
the longer the estimation interval of consistency in past OEG, the larger the return gap
between the CLG-CHG portfolio and the benchmark portfolio (see Figure 2).

[Table 111
The test results of portfolios formed based on consistency of growth rates in EBG
are reported in Table 12. As in the previous two tables, Panel A includes the return
performance for the benchmark portfolio, while returns for portfolios constructed based
on consistency of past growth rates are reported in Panels B and C. Results in Table 12

indicate that across all formation and investment horizons except one, firms in the CLG
portfolio earn a higher return compared to firms in the CHG portfolio. The exception is
the returns in the first post-formation year for the benchmark portfolios. The average
annual return for the CLG-CHG portfolio ranges from 0.68 (t

=

1.45) as shown in Panel

A under the AverageIAR column to 4.95 percent (t = 2.45) as shown in Panel C under the
AverageIAR column. Similarly, the CLG-CHG average size-adjusted return varies from
0.44 (t

=

0.91) to 4.08 percent (t

=

2.32) per year (see Panel A and Panel C under the

AverageIASAR column, respectively). Both returns are positively related to the
measurement horizons of past financial performance.
Consistent with the evidence reported in Table 6, Panel A (Year 11R1 column) of
Table 12 shows that for one year of past earnings growth, firms in the CHG portfolio
earned raw returns of 4.65 percent (t

=

3.54) greater than that of firms in the CLG

portfolio. Similar results obtain for size-adjusted returns (5.07 percent; t = 3.79) as shown
in Panel A under the Year lISAR1 column. Evidence provided in Panel B and Panel C
indicates that the behavior of the CLG-CHG return in the first year compared to second
year for all estimation periods suggests that a drift in stock prices persists as more years
of performance consistency are included in the estimation period. This pattern is similar
to that depicted in Figure 1.
As shown in the last row of Panels B and C under the AverageIAR column, the
returns for the CLG-CHG portfolio exceed that of the benchmark portfolio by margins
ranging from 2.59 (t = 3.73) to 4.63 percent (t = 2.02). The magnitude of this return gap
increases as more years of past earnings growth rates are included in the estimation
period as illustrated in Figure 2.

[Table 12 and Figure 21
The return results for portfolios following consistent growth patterns in CFG over
the preceding one through four years are shown in Panels A-C of Table 13. These results
suggest that firms consistently ranking in the lowest growth rate (CLG) outperform firms
consistently ranking in the highest growth (CHG) across the four formation intervals.
Firms in the CLG portfolios earn average annual returns varying from 19.70 percent
(Panel A under the AverageIAR column) to 22.55 percent (Panel C under the
AverageIAR column) compared to average returns ranging from 19.12 percent to 16.82
percent for firms in the CHG portfolios for one and four year measurement intervals,
respectively. This gives rise to return differentials of 0.58 (t = 1.29) and 5.73 percent (t =
2.83), i.e., -the CLG-CHG return, for the same formation periods (see Panel A and Panel
C under the AverageIAR column, respectively). Further, on average the CLG-CHG
portfolio earned a size-adjusted return of 0.35 (t

=

0.75) and 4.61 percent (t

=

2.30) for

the one-year and four-year estimation intervals, respectively (see Panel A and Panel C
under the AverageIASAR column). The CLG-CHG returns increases uniformly as more
years of past performance date are included in the analysis (see Figure 2).
In the first post-formation year, the CLG-CHG portfolio earned -3.77 (t = -3.02)
and -4.19 percent (t = -3.37) for raw returns and size-adjusted returns, respectively (Panel
A under the Year 11R1 and SARl columns). This finding suggests a financial momentum
effect after relatively strong (weak) past cash flow performance consistent with evidence
reported in Table 7. This is evident from the pattern of the CLG-CHG first year return
compared to its second year return for all estimation horizons (see Figure 1). Further, the

difference in returns between the CLG-CHG and the benchmark portfolios affirms the
positive impact of consistency in prior performance on future returns as documented in
Tables 11 and 12. Results in Panel B and Panel C (under the AverageIAR column) show
that the CLG-CHG portfolio outperforms the benchmark portfolio by an average annual
return ranging from 2.41 (t

=

3.19) to 5.47 percent (t

=

2.38). The return differential

widens as the measurement period of past performance variables increases.

[Table 131
In Panel A through Panel C of Table 14, the results for portfolios based on growth
consistency in ACFG are provided. The return performance documented in this table
shows that the CLG portfolio, on average, achieves a higher return between 20.38 percent
(Panel A under the AverageIAR column) and 23.42 percent (Panel C under the
AverageIAR column) for one- and four-year formation intervals, respectively, compared
to 19.49 and 16.35 percent for the CHG portfolio for the same estimation periods. The
average annual return gap between the CLG and CHG portfolios is 0.89 (t
7.06 percent (t

=

=

1.84) and

2.43) for the same formation intervals indicated above as shown in

Panels A and C under the AverageIAR column. Results are similar for the size-adjusted
returns.
Results in Panel A indicate that firms in the CHG portfolio earn a raw returns 3.30
percent (t

=

2.70) and size-adjusted returns 3.73 percent (t

=

3.03) greater than those of

firms in the CLG portfolio in the first post-formation year (see Panel A under the Year
11R1 and SARl columns). This evidence is consistent with results reported in Panel A,
Table 8. The behavior of first year one returns of the CLG-CHG portfolio relative to that

of its second year returns across all estimation periods is similar to the pattern illustrated
in Figure 1 indicating the presence of price drift. The return gap between the CLG-CHG
portfolio and the benchmark portfolio ranges from 2.61 percent (t = 3.25) as shown in the
last row of Panel B under the AverageIAR column to 6.57 percent (t = 2.16) as shown in
the last row of Panel C under the AverageIAR column. The difference in size-adjusted
return is similar.

[Table 141
Results for portfolios based on consistency of past stock returns over the prior one
to five years are presented in Panel A through Panel C of Table 15. The findings indicate
that firms consistently ranking in the bottom growth (CLG), on average, yield a higher
return than firms consistently ranking in the top growth (CHG) across all investment and
estimation horizons. For instance, the CLG-CHG portfolio has an average annual raw
return ranging from 2.71 percent (t-statistics

=

4.37) for the first estimation period as

shown in Panel A under the AverageIAR column and 8.33 percent (t-statistics = 3.51) for
the four-year estimation horizons as shown in Panel C under the AverageIAR column.
This return differential increases uniformly with the estimation period of past stock
returns (see Figure 2).
The returns reported in Panel A of Table 15 are consistent with the evidence
provided in Panel A of Table 9. In both cases, the return spreads between low- and highgrowth firms (prior winners and losers) are not significantly different from zero. The
results suggest that findings reported in Table 9 are not attributable to extreme
observations associated with decile ranking since the influence of extreme observations is
significantly reduced in consistency sorting.

The pattern of the CLG-CHG return in the first holding year compared to the
second year for all formation horizons is consistent with price momentum effects
following an incremental year of consistent high (low) past returns (see Figure 1).
Results reported in Panel B and Panel C of Table 15 reveal that consistency of a
firm's prior stock returns affects the behavior of its subsequent prices. On average, the
CLG-CHG portfolio has a higher return ranging from 3.79 percent (t
percent (t

=

=

3.41) to 6.33

2.74) than that of the benchmark portfolio (see the last row of Panel B and

Panel C under the AverageIAR column). This return spread increases uniformly with the
measurement horizon.
In summary, the findings of this subsection and their relation to the predictions of
behavioral models include the following. First, on average, consistent low-growth firms
(CLG) earn superior returns relative to consistent high-growth firms (CHG) across all
estimation intervals and performance variables. The CLG-CHG return is an increasing
function of the measurement period. This behavior is driven by the increasing returns for
firms in the CLG portfolio and the diminishing returns for firm in the CHG portfolio as
more years of past performance are included in the estimation period. This finding is
consistent with the predictions of psychology-based theories (e.g., Daniel et al. [I9981
and Barberis et al. [1998]). The central theme of these theories is that investors overly
emphasize a firm's past performance when projecting its future prospects. This causes
stocks of firms consistently performing well in the past to be over-priced, and
subsequently, these stocks earn lower returns as investors are disappointed by the actual
performance of these firms. Conversely, stocks of firms consistently performing poorly in
the past become under-priced, and these stocks generate higher returns in the future as

investors are surprised by the relatively strong performance of these firms. These findings
support hypotheses H5 through H8.
Second, for a one-year formation interval, firms in the CHG portfolios outperform
firms in the CLG portfolios in the first year for all variables with the exception of SG
and, to some degree, PRET. This evidence is consistent with the existence of financial
momentum effects following an exceptionally strong (weak) financial performance.
Further, the pattern of the CLG-CHG return in the first year compared to the second year
across all estimation intervals is consistent with the effects of price drift even in longer
estimation horizons.
Traditionally, evidence of momentum is attributed to investors' under-reaction to
information included in firms' past financial performance (e.g., Barberis et al. [1998]).
However, Daniel et al. (1998) view such findings as evidence of a market over-reaction
that continues to drift before prices eventually return to fundamental values. Similarly,
they view the evidence of long-run price reversal as a market correction to prior overpricing. According to Daniel et al.'s (1998) model, if the initial financial drift reported
here is due to investor failure to incorporate fundamental information contained in past
performance variables into stock prices in a timely manner, a subsequent price reversal
should not be observed.
Finally, on average, the CLG-CHG portfolio achieves greater returns relative to
the benchmark portfolio across all variables with the exception of SG. This return
differential increases uniformly as more estimation intervals of past performance are
included. Thus, hypotheses H 10 through H 12 are supported.

Daniel et al. (1998) attribute market over-reaction to investors' overconfidence
and self-attribution bias. In their theory, investors' overconfidence in their investment
skills and ability to identify future winning stocks creates the first part of the overreaction, while subsequent evidence confirming investors' prior actions leads to further
over-reaction. Results reported here are consistent with this prediction. Findings of this
study indicate that the second and the third years of evidence confirming performance
growth have the most significant impact on future returns. After the third year, further
evidence affirming the already observed pattern of past financial growth has little effect
on the behavior of future returns. This might be because investors have already formed
strong opinions about the future prospects of consistent low (high) growth firms (see
Figure 2). In other words, investors expect these firms to maintain this level of
performance for many years to come, and this expectation is impounded in the current
stock prices.

6.3 Regression Test Results

Analyses reported in the previous section for various growth portfolios based
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past growth rates in performance variables reveal that firms with low growth rates
generally earn higher returns relative to firms with high-growth rates. However,
descriptive statistics presented (see Tables 2 and 3) suggests that low-growth firms are
more likely to be associated with slightly higher book-to-market ratios (BIM) compared
to high-growth firms. In this section, past performance measures will be assessed to
determine whether they have incremental predictive power for subsequent stock returns
after controlling for Beta and BIM. For each post-formation year, the annual size-adjusted

abnormal return (SAR) for firm j is regressed on the scaled decile ranks of past growth
rates in its performance measures during the estimation interval as well as on the scaled
decile ranks of its Beta, BIM, and Size at the beginning of the period in cross-sectional
regressions.25
For each post-formation year (years 1 through 5), the regressions in Equations 1
and 2, as well as a regression with past performance variables and Size only, are
estimated over the sample period. The magnitudes, signs, and significance levels of the
variable coefficients are virtually identical for all three cross-sectional regression models.
Therefore, discussion in this section will concentrate on the full model (model 3). The
time-series averages of these estimates are computed from annual regressions, and their tstatistics are calculated from the time-series variation of these coefficients as in Fama and
MacBeth (1973). Results presented in Table 16 through Table 21 are based on annual
regressions for the second post-formation year.26 The decision to report the parameter
estimates for two-year returns after portfolio formation is based on the similarity between
regression estimates across all holding horizons.
The regression results for firms based on SG are presented in Table 16. The
coefficients for SG are negative and statistically significant, for the first three estimation
horizons. However, the magnitudes of the coefficients and t-statistics are inversely
related to the measurement period of the past performance variable. For example, using
model 3, the coefficient for SG is -0.053, -0.043, and -0.001 (t

25

=

-3.81, -2.51, and -0.03,

Although SAR is used as the dependent variable in the regression approach, size ranks are included in the
regressions to avoid biased coefficients on past performance measures (e.g., Bernard [1987], Foster et al.
[1984], Ali et al. [2003], and Desai et al. [2004]). In unreported analysis, using raw returns instead of SAR
obtains similar results.
26
Unreported results based on the 2ndand 3rdestimation intervals exhibit the same patterns as reported
results.

respectively) for the prior one, three, and five years' sales growth, respectively, as shown
in Panels A through C, Table 16.

[Table 161

In Table 17, regression estimates for firms ranked by OEG over the past one,
three, and five years are reported. These results indicate that the variable coefficients for
OEG across all estimation intervals are negative and significant (ranging from -0.056 (t =
-2.35) to -0.074 (t

=

-2.40). This evidence is consistent with the portfolio analyses

reported in the previous section. Findings in the portfolio approach indicate that a trading
strategy of going long (short) on low (high) growth firms earns a substantial profit. This
profit increases as more years of past financial performance are included.
The regression coefficients for SARl are negative and significant for all
formation periods of past operating earnings growth, suggesting that the momentum
profitability documented in the previous section is one factor in the market's overreaction to firms' past financial performance. Jegadeesh and Titman (200 1) argue that if
new information is gradually incorporated into stock market prices, subsequent stock
returns cannot be predicted once this information is completely reflected in stock prices.
They further argue that returns to a trading strategy based on realized past returns after
the first twelve months should be zero. Therefore, if firms' price momentum following a
period of remarkably high (low) past realizations is a product of investor over-reaction to
outstanding past performance, the momentum returns and subsequent reversals are likely
to be negatively related (Daniel et al. 1998).

[Table 171

The results of the regression analyses for stocks based on EBG are presented in
Table 18, arranged in Panels A through C by estimation intervals. Coefficients for EBG
are negative and significant for all estimation intervals, varying from -0.064 (t = -3.69) to
-0.058 (t

=

-2.75) for one and five years of past growth, respectively. These results

confirm the predictive ability of EBG after controlling for market betas and book-tomarket ratios. As well, although the regression coefficient for SARl is not statistically
significant for the second post-formation year, it is negative and significant for year 3 and
year 4 across all estimation intervals (i.e., in the five-year estimation period, the
estimated coefficient for year three is -0.099 with a t-statistic of -4.68, and the estimated
coefficient for year four is -0.072 with a t-statistic of 3.35). This evidence is consistent
with the argument that price drift effects following exceptional financial performance are
a manifestation of investors' over-reaction rather than a market under-reaction as is
commonly believed (e.g., Daniel et al. [I 9981 and Lee and Swaminathan [2000]).

[Table 181
In Table 19, the regression analyses results for firms on the basis of CFG are
presented. These results indicate that the coefficients for CFG are negative and
significant for all estimation horizons. In addition, the magnitudes and significance of the
coefficients for CFG increase uniformly as more years of past cash flow growth are
included in the regression analyses.
The above finding is consistent with the evidence reported in the preceding
portfolio analyses and with prior studies (e.g., Lakonishok et al. [1994], La Porta et al.
[1997], and Desai et al. [2004]). The variable SARl is negative and significant across all

measurement intervals of CFG suggesting a reversal of market momentum returns. Once
again this evidence supports the view that price momentum observed subsequent to
relatively strong (weak) financial performance is a market over-reaction rather than a
market under-reaction (e.g., Daniel et al. [I9981 and Lee and Swaminathan [2000]).

[Table 191
The results of the regression estimates for firms ranked by ACFG are presented in
Table 20. These results indicate that the coefficients for ACFG are -0.065 (t = -3.12) and
-0.075 (t = -2.56) for one and five years estimation intervals, respectively. This evidence
is consistent with the findings reported in the preceding portfolio analyses in which a
strong association between estimation intervals of past financial measures and subsequent
stock returns was indicated. The regression coefficients for SARl are negative for all
measurement durations of past growth rates in ACFG. This finding confirms the
existence of a negative relation between a positive price drift in the first year after
portfolios formation and portfolio returns for years 2 through 5.

[Table 201
The time-series regression coefficients analyzing portfolios based on PRET over
the preceding one to five years are reported in Table 2 1. The coefficients for PRET are
-0.1 10 (t

=

-5.09) and -0.1 14 (t = -5.35) for one year and five years of past stock return

data, respectively. SARl is negative across all estimation periods, which is evidence of a
strong relation between the market momentum effects and subsequent price reversals
documented in prior studies (e.g., Jegadeesh and Titman [I9931 and DeBondt and Thaler

[1985]). This finding is inconsistent with that of Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004) who
report a weak relation between the intermediate price drift and long-term price reversals.
However, it supports the view that the intermediate price drift should be viewed as a
market over-reaction that corrects itself in the form of a price reversal over the long term
(e.g., Daniel et al. [I9981 and Lee and Swaminathan [2000]).

[Table 211
In conclusion, the evidence summarized in Tables 16 through 21 suggests the
following. The average regression coefficients for all past performance measures (except
SG in the last two estimation periods) are negative across all estimation horizons. This
finding is consistent with evidence reported in the portfolio analyses approach. The
evidence reported in the portfolio test shows that buying (selling) value (growth) firms
generate a high return and this returns increases uniformly with the estimation intervals
of past performance measures.
Third, the size-adjusted abnormal returns in the first year are negatively related to
the size-adjusted abnormal returns for years 2 through 5 for all performance variables and
estimation periods. This is consistent with evidence of a return drift documented in
preceding portfolio analyses. As discussed previously, this negative association suggests
that the momentum profit reported in year 1 after portfolio formation is more likely to be
an integral part of market over-reaction to exceptionally high (low) past financial growth
that subsequently reverts to fundamental values over the long term. Furthermore, the
evidence provided in this study contradicts the findings of Grinblatt and Moskowitz

(2004). They report a weak association between intermediate price drift and long-run
price reversal.
Taken together, the evidence is consistent with the predictions of behavioral
models (e.g., Lakonishok et al. [I9941 and Daniel et al. [1998]) that investors overact to
firms' historical financial performance because investors are likely to extrapolate firms'
past performance into the future. Thus, firms achieving relatively strong (weak) financial
performance in the past are expected to maintain this performance almost indefinitely. As
a consequence, high (low) growth firms are likely to be over-priced (under-priced), and
subsequently, these firms should under-perform (outperform) the market as their market
prices returns to fundamental values.

CHAPTER VII
SENSITIVITY ANALYSES

7.1 Largest Firms
Most abnormal returns are said to be limited to small firms due to their
associations with higher trading costs that make them expensive to be included in most
trading strategies. To ensure that the results reported in this dissertation are not driven by
abnormal returns attributed to small firms, analyses presented in Tables 4 through 22 are
repeated using only the largest 50 percent of firms in terms of their market values of
equity capital in the study sample. Untabulated results of the above analysis reveal that

the key findings reported in the present study are robust even after restricting the analysis
to the largest 50 percent of firms.

7.2 Seasonality
Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004) argue that, unlike price momentum, the effect of
the long-run price reversal is largely attributed to a January effect. They conclude that
these two phenomena are driven by different forces with different seasonal behavior.
However, the findings of prior research suggest that the January effect is more
pronounced for losing firms across all holding horizons, and it is not a distinct feature of
the long-term price reversal as suggested by Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004). Jegadeesh
and Titman (1993, 2001) suggest that momentum strategy profitability has a strong
seasonal component. They show that past winners earn higher returns compared to prior
losers in all months except January in which losers outperform winners.
To examine whether the behavior of stock returns, particularly that of losing
stocks, differs across all post-formation horizons, the return performance of all portfolios
are analyzed separately in January and in February .through December of each year.
Untabulated results show that portfolio returns are not concentrated in January across all
variables, estimation intervals, and investment horizons. However, in the first year after
portfolio formation across all measurement periods, firms in the lowest stock return
deciles yield higher stock returns compared to firms in the highest return deciles in
January. This finding is consistent with Jegadeesh and Titman (1993,2001).

CHAPTER VIII
Conclusions

In the classic economic theories, individuals are assumed to be perfectly rational
with infinite information processing capacities. The standard market models, such as the
capital asset pricing model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965), the efficient
market hypothesis of Fama (1965, 1970), and the arbitrage pricing theory (APT) of Ross
(1976) are based on these two assumptions. Further, the traditional market argument is
that even if investors are biased and make mistakes, the resulting errors are not correlated
across individuals; they have no bearing on market price formation because they average
out in market equilibrium.
However, a growing literature on judgments and decision making processes
suggests that divergence from rationality is common rather than an exception in human
behavior due to limitations of time, information processing capacities, and other
cognitive resource constraints (e.g., Hirslileifer [2001], Simon [1955],Trivers [1985,
19911, and Tversky and Kahneman [1974]). In recent years, several authors (e.g.,
Barberis et al. [1998], Daniel et al. [1998], and Hong and Stein [1999]) have incorporated
investors' psychology into economic models in attempts to provide a parsimonioustheoretical framework that accounts for the factors that influence market prices.
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) suggest people are likely to over-react to salient,
attention-grabbing, and easy to recall information. Chan et al. (2004) argue that financial
measures are not only salient, but they are also readily available to the vast majority of
financial market participants. Lee (2001) argues that to affect market prices, investor
sentiments must be systematic and that the role of accounting research is to contribute to

our understanding about factors that give rise to these common investor biases and their
impact on the market pricing mechanism.
This dissertation has three objectives. First, it examines whether past growth
patterns of firms' performance measures are likely to influence investor perceptions
about the future prospects of these firms. Second, using a range of formation intervals,
this study investigates whether the interaction between observed patterns and estimation
horizons of these variables affect investor expectations. Finally, it assesses whether the
profitability of a momentum strategy and long run price reversals are a manifestation of a
market over-reaction as suggested by recent studies (e.g., Daniel et al. [I9981 and Lee
and Swaminathan [2000]), or whether they are the result of some other underlying cause
(e.g., Grinblatt and Moskowitz [2004]).
Financial performance variables used in this study are annual data on sales,
earnings, cash flow, and stock returns, measured over varying time horizons from a
sample of publicly traded firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ exchanges
from 1983 to 1999. To assess questions raised in this dissertation, various portfolio and
regression tests were used. The results reported establish a number of empirical facts
summarized below followed by a discussion of the relation to the extant literature.
Firms in low-growth decile portfolios earn significantly higher returns compared
firms in high-growth decile portfolios across performance measures, estimation intervals,
and investment periods. The return differentials between the highest and the lowest
growth deciles is positive for all post-formation years except in the first year for
portfolios formed based on one year of prior financial performance data. This return gap

between firms in high- and low-growth deciles increases monotonically as more years of
past data are included in the analysis.
Firms sorted by one-year growth rates in all accouiiting-based measures except
SG provide evidence of a strong financial momentum effect in the first year after
portfolio formation.

The size and behavior of the portfolio return in the first year

compared to returns in years 2 through 5 indicates the existence of a price drift, although
the magnitude and the persistence of this drift dissipates as the estimation intervals
increase.
The finding reported in this study sharply contradicts Chan et al. (2004) who
examine the marginal impact of past growth rates in operating and net income and sales
on subsequent stock returns. Sorting firms into growth quintiles based on growth rates of
these variables in the prior one and five years using quarterly and annual data,
respectively, they found no discernable evidence of price reversals over the ensuing 36
months. They document weak evidence of return drift, particularly for operating and net
income measures, over the ensuing 3-6 months following the formation date, but by the
end of the year, the return differential between low and high-growth firms virtually
disappears. However, results of this thesis are consistent with other prior studies (e.g.,
Lakonishok et al. [I9941 and Desai et al. [2004]).
The evidence provided in this study is consistent with the behavioral model
predictions that investors overestimate (underestimate) the growth prospects of high
(low) growth firms (e.g., Lakonishok et al. [1994], Daniel et al. [1998], and Barberis et
al. [1998]). Thus, firms achieving relatively strong (weak) financial performance in the
past tend to be over-priced (under-priced). Subsequently, however, prior high growth

firms under-perform prior low growth firms as investors come to realize that their prior
expectations have not materialized.
Consistent low growth firms have greater returns relative to their consistent high
growth firm counterparts across performance measures, estimation horizons, and holding
periods, except in the first post-formation year. The return spread between these two
portfolios increases uniformly with the estimation intervals of past performance
measures. However, the evidence reported in this study shows that the second and third
years of evidence confirming prior growth rates have the most marginal effect on future
returns. Beyond the third year, for example, the impact of an incremental year of
confirming evidence observed in the prior periods virtually disappears.
Prior studies (e.g., Lakonishok et al. [I9941 and Desai et al. [2004]) have deemed
a five-year period of past financial performance data as a sufficient time frame for
investors to project a firm's past performance into the future. However, the evidence
documented in this study indicates that it may not take investors more than two to three
years of consistent growth patterns to upwardly bias their expectations about a firm's
future prospects.
In the first post-formation year, consistent high-growth firms outperform
consistent low growth firms based on one year of past performance. This finding affirms
the effects of financial momentum following exceptionally high or low financial
performance. The price drift in the first year of the holding period seems to persist even
in longer estimation horizons.
Results of cross-sectional multiple regressions show that growth rates in past
performance variables are strongly related to subsequent future returns after controlling

for market betas and book-to-market ratios. This relation between future stock returns
and historical financial measures strengthens as the estimation interval of these variables
increases. Regression analysis reveals that first year returns are negatively related to
returns in years 2 through 5 across all performance measures. This evidence is consistent
with the view that the long-term price reversals are a response to prior market overreaction (e.g., Lee and Swaminathan [2000] and Daniel et al. [1998]). This finding is
inconsistent with that of Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004).
Sorting firms by their prior 3 to 12-month stock returns conditional on trading
volume, Lee and Swaminathan (2000) report that price drift in the first year after
portfolio formation are almost nullified by price reversals in years 2 through 5. This is not
the case for accounting-based measures used in this study. Although there is strong
evidence of financial drift in year 1 returns in all measures (except SG) following one
year of prior relatively high (low) financial performance data, the average price reversal
for years 2 through 5 for the same estimation interval is three times greater than the price
drift observed in year 1. If this price reversal is a response to a prior market over-reaction
(e.g., Lee and Swaminathan [2000] and Daniel et al. [1998]), the price drift documented
in the first year after portfolios are formed is only the final manifestation of that overreaction. This evidence raises potential questions for future research. Specifically, a test
that tracks the behavior of stock prices over both the estimation and test periods might be
a better way to assess the relation between these two phenomena.
Chan et al. (2004) find no discernable evidence that consistency in a firm's
historical financial performance predicts subsequent stock returns. However, the findings
of this thesis show that, on average, consistently low growth firms outperform their

consistently high growth firm counterparts across all variables and estimation intervals.
In this dissertation, I compare return performance for these two groups of firms. An
interesting question for future research is to examine whether return performance differs
within each category, i.e., consistent-high-growth firms vs. inconsistent-growth-firms and
consistent-low-growth firms vs. inconsistent-low-growth firms.
Finally, for prior one-year data of SG, PI outperforms PI0 while in OEG for the
same estimation interval, PI0 outperfornls PI. Chan et al. (2004) observe similar
findings. This evidence suggests that growth in operating expenses might cause "an
inversion." Further, the results provided in this thesis indicate that SG is not a good
predictor of subsequent stock returns compared to the alternative accounting-based
performance variables, i.e., OEG, EBG CFT, and ACFG. Future research may examine
whether patterns of operating expenses explains this difference.
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Appendix A
Annual Growth Rates in Past Firm Performance Measures

The annual growth rate in sales per share for firm j over a range of estimation
horizons from one to five years prior to portfolio formation date is computed as follows:

where SGjtis the annual geometric mean of growth rate in sales per share for firm j over
the estimation intervals, ranging from one to five years relative to portfolio formation
date t, ASPSjTis year-to-year changes in sales per share (SPS) for firm j in year z scaled
by the average SPS lagged values in the prior two years, where z ranges from -5 to -1
depending on the measurement horizon of past sale growth.
The annual growth rate in earnings per share for firm j over the period prior to the
formation horizons is computed as follows:

where EG,t is the annual geometric mean of growth rate in earnings per share for firm j
over the years preceding portfolio formation, AEPS,, is year-to-year changes in earnings
per share (EPS) for firm j in year z scaled by the absolute value of the average EPS

lagged values in the prior two years, where z ranges from -5 to -1 depending on the
measurement horizon of past earnings growth.
The annual per share growth in cash flow for firm j over the estimation intervals
is computed as follows:

where CFGjt is the annual geometric mean of growth rate in cash flow per share for firm j
over the estimatioii periods prior to the formation date t, ACFPSj, is year-to-year changes
in cash flow per share (CFPS) for firm j in year z scaled by the absolute value of the
average CFPS lagged values in the prior two years, where z ranges from -5 to -1
depending on the measurement horizon of past cash flow growth.
To adjust operating cash flow for accruals, total accruals are estimated using the
balance sheet approach: 27

Accruals = (ACA - ACash) - (ACL - ASTD - ATP) - Dep

where ACA is change in current assets, ACash is change in casWcash equivalents, ACL is
change in short-term liabilities, ASTD is the change in long term debt included in current
liabilities, ATP is change in income taxes payable, and Dep is depreciation and
amortization expenses. Accruals are scaled by average total assets. Accounting operating

27

This is consistent with prior research (e.g., Sloan [1996]).
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cash flow (ACF) is defined as earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued
operations plus depreciation and amortization expense minus working capital accruals.
The annual stock returns for a firm j over time periods prior to formation horizon
are calculated using monthly stock returns as follows:

where PRetjtis the geometric mean of returns on the firm j's stocks over the measurement
period prior to the formation date t, and Returnj, is the annual return for firm j in year z,
where z ranges from -5 to -1 depending on the measurement horizon of past stock returns.

Table 1
Summary/Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
Panel A: S a m ~ l eSizes of Firms with Annual Data Reauirements
Performance Measures

I Estimation I

Panel B: Spearman (Pearson) Correlations among Performance Measures t

Spearman (Pearson) correlations are in the upper-right (lower-left) diagonal of the Panel.
Variable Definitions:
SG
= t h e geometric mean of growth rate in sales over the 5-year estimation period before portfolio formation.
= the geometric mean of growth rate in operating earnings over the 5-year estimation period before portfolio
OEG
formation.
EBG
= the geometric mean of growth rate in earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations over
the 5-year estimation period before portfolio formation.
= the geometric mean of growth rate in cash flow as defined in the finance literature over the 5-year
CFG
estimation period before portfolio formation.
ACFG = the geometric mean of growth in cash flow as defined in the accounting literature over the 5-year
estimation period before portfolio formation.
PRET
= t h e geometric mean of stock returns over the 5-year estimation period before portfolio formation.
BM
= the book-to-market ratios at the fiscal year-end prior to portfolio formation date.
Beta
= a firm's market beta. It is calculated using monthly returns over the past 60 months, with a minimum of 36
months, prior to portfolio formation date.
= market value of equity capital at the portfolio formation date t. It is calculated as the number of shares
Size
outstanding multiplied by the stock prices at portfolio formation date.
t Characteristics of firms in the five-year estimation interval.

Table 2
Descriptive Statistics for Growth Portfolios
'anel A: Firms Sorted by Past Financial Performance Growth for the Prior One Year
Performance Measures
Portfolio Statistics
SG
OEG
EBG
CFG
ACFG
PRET
1.09
1.09
1.11
1.14
1.15
Beta
1.05
0.94
0.95
0.91
0.83
0.96
BM
0.92
193
28 1
220
187
264
Size
1398

Panel B: Firms Sorted by Past Financial Performance Growth for the Prior Two Years
Performance Measures
I

Panel C: Firms Sorted bv Past Financial Performance Growth for the Prior Five Years
I
Performance Measures
I
Portfolio Statistics
SG
OEG
EBG
CFG
ACFG j PRET
1.05
0.99
1.07
1.14
1.16
Beta
1.21
0.82
1.10
P1
BM
1.04
1.02
1.03 1
1.01

'
,

Beta, BM, and S I Lare
~ defined under Table 1 All firms with ava~labledata from 1983 to 1999 ranked by growth rates
in their past financial performance variables grouped into 10 growth deciles (PI -P10). The top 10% of fG&s with the
highest growth rate is included in P I 0 and the bottom 10% of firms with the lowest growth rate is assigned to PI.

Table 3
Descriptive Statistics for Consistent Growth Portfolios
Panel A: Firms Sorted bv Growth Consistencv for the Prior One Year
Performance Measures
Portfolio
Statistics
OEG
EBG
CFG
ACFG
1648
1646
1660
1318
Firms
1.oo
1.oo
1.oo
1.03
Beta
CLG
0.86
0.86
0.85
0.78
BM
909
9 17
906
92 8
Size
1648
1646
1660
1318
Firms
1.03
1.03
1.04
1.08
Beta
CHG
0.77
0.77
0.77
0.72
BM
797
872
818
753
Size

I
PRET
1597
1.01
0.79
872
1597
1.02
0.73
1380

Beta
BM
Size
Panel C: Firms Sorted by Growth Consistency for the Prior Four Years
Performance Measures
SG
OEG
EBG
CFG
ACFG : PRET
Portfolio Statistics
CHG

'

from 1983 to 1999, all firms with data on past performance measures are ranked independently by their growth rates in
these variables over the prior one to four years and assigned to 3 growth groups (top 40 percent, middle 20 percent, and
bottom 40 percent). Firms in top (bottom) 40 percent are referred to as high (low) growth firms. Firms in the high
growth group consistently rank in the top 40 percent each year for the entire estimation intervals are classified as
"consistent high growthfirms. Similarly, low growth firms consistently rank in the bottom 40 percent each year for
the entire estimation intervals are defined as "consistent low growthfirms. " Firms in the highest and lowest 40 percent
based on one-year growth rates are used as benchmarks.
"

Table 4
Return Performance for Portfolios Based on Sales
Growth Rates (SG)

Panel B: Growth Portfolios Ranked by the Prior Three Year SG
Year 4
Year 1
Year 2
Year 3
Portfolio
SARl
7.72
3.03
-1.03
-0.68
8.76
3.47

Year 5

Averape

SARS
-1.44
-1.10
3.17
1.48
-1.74
-0.71

(see Table 2 for portfolio construction procedures). These portfolios arc held without rcbalancing for the ensuing five years. Five
annual rcturns arc calculated, R1 through K5 and size-adjusted abnormal rcturns, SAKI through SAR5 for each estimation pcriod.
Further, avcragc annual rcturns (AK) and avcragc size-adjusted abnormal rcturns (ASAK) arc computcd over the test pcriod years I
through 5. The annual returns arc calculated as the geometric average monthly rcturns for five 12-month pcriod after portfolio
Ihrmation date. SAK is comp~ltcdas the annual raw rcturns on a firm stock less the avcragc size-decile returns to which a firm
belongs. Kcturns arc calculated each year and averaged over the sample period and the time-series variation is used to compute the tstatistics using the Fama-MacBeth (1973) method. The t-statistics are reported in bold.

ASAR
3.84
4.09
1.85
3.50
1.99
2.08

Table 5
Return Performance for Portfolios Based on Growth
Rates in Operating Earnings (OEG)
Panel A: Growth Portfolios Ranked bv the Prior One Year OEG

PI0

-1.85 -2.33 3.55
3.66 2.33
2.06 1.60, 1.27 2.28
1.91 4.10
3.30)
Panel B: Growth Portfolios Ranked bv the Prior Three Year OEG
Year 1
Year 2
Year 3
Year 4
Year 5
Average
Portfolio
R1 SARl R2 SAR2 R3 SAR3 R4 SAR4 R5 SARS AR
ASAR

0.84
0.46 2.94
2.78
2.42
1.96 2.63
1.86 3.16
Panel C: Growth Portfolios Ranked bv the Prior Five Year OEG

2.55

5.33

Return performance presented in this table is for portfolios formed based on OEG over one to five years prior to portfolio formation
(see Table 2 for portfolio construction procedures). These portfolios are held without rebalancing for the ensuing five years. See
Table 4 for the definition and the calculation of R1 through R5, SARl through S A R S as well as AR, ASAR, and the t-statistics (in
bold).

4.07

1

Table 6
Return Performance for Portfolios Based on Growth Rates in
Earnings before Extraordinary Items (EBG)
Panel A: Growth Portfolios Ranked by the Prior One Year EBG
Year 1
Year 2
Year 3
Year 4
Year 5
Average
Portfolio
R1 SARl R2 S A W R 3 SAR3 R4 SAR4 R 5 SARS AR
ASAR

1 PI0

I
I PI0

-2.48 -2.93 3.76
3.93 2.50
2.26 2.11
1.83 2.19
1.82 4.36
3.56)
Panel B: Growth Portfolios Ranked by the Prior Three Year EBG
Year 2
Year 3
Year 4
Year 5
Average
Year 1
R1 SARl R2 SAR2 R 3 SAR3 R4 SAR4 R 5 SARS AR
ASAR

-

0.95
0.67 3.13
3.19 2.31
2.02 1.93
1.30 2.84
2.22
Panel C: Growth Portfolios Ranked by the Prior Five Year EBG
Year2
Year3
.
Year4
Year 5
Year 1

5.59

,

'

1.33

0.87

3.18

2.95

2.25

1.74

4.41

3.56

4.44

3.69

'

4.21

1

Average

7.17

Return ~erformanceuresented in this table IS for uortfolios formed based on EBG over one to five years Drior to uortfol~oformation
(see Table 2 for portfolio construction procedures). These portfolios are held without rebalancing for the ensuing five years. See
Table 4 for the definition and the calculation of R l through R5, SARl through SAR5 as well as AR, ASAR, and the t-statistics (in
bold).

5.011

Table 7
Return Performance for Portfolios Based on Growth Rates in Cash
Flow (CFG) as Defined in the Finance Literature
Panel A: Growth Portfolios Ranked bv the Prior One Year C F G

PI0

1

/ PI0

1

-1.65 -2.06 3.76
4.08 2.53
2.30
1.40
1.16 2.23
2.08 4.55
3.87
Panel B: Growth Portfolios Ranked bv the Prior Three Year CFG
Year 1
Year 2
Year 3
Year 4
Year 5
Average
Portfolio
R1 S A R l R2 SAR2 R 3 SAR3 R4 SAR4 R5 SAR5 AR
ASAR

1.14
0.88 3.53
3.64 2.47
2.12 2.04
1.63 3.11
2.49 6.54
4.79
Panel C: Growth Portfolios Ranked bv the Prior Five Year CFG
Year 1
Year 2
Year 3
Year 4
Year 5
Average
Portfolio
R1 SARl R2 S A W R3 SAR3 R4 SAR4 R5 SAR5 AR
ASAR

Return performance presented in this table is for portfolios formed based on CFG over one to five years prior to portfolio formation
(see Table 2 for portfolio construction procedures). These portfolios are held without rebalancing for the ensuing five years. See
Table 4 for the definition and the calculation of R l through R5. SARl through SAR5 as well as AR, ASAR, and the t-statistics (in
bold).

Return Performance for Portfolios Based on Growth Rates in Cash
Flow (ACFG) as Defined in the Accounting Literature
Average

21.58
14.21

5.34

(see Table 2 for portfolio construction procedures). These portfolios are held without rebalancing for the ensuing five years. See
Table 4 for the definition and the calculation of R1 through R5, SARI through SAR5 as well as AR, ASAR, and the t-statistics (in
bold).

4.21
4.62
4.83

Table 9
Return Performance for Portfolios Based on Stock Returns (PRET)

Panel C: Growth Portfolios Ranked bv the Prior Five Year PRET

PI0

2.38

2.12

5.26

5.96

2.73

1.96

2.94

1.85

3.68

2.16

5.65

Return performance presented In thls table IS for portfolios formed based on PRET over one to live years prlor to portfolio formation
(see able 2 for portfolio construction procedures). These portfolios are held without rebalancing for the ensuing five years. See
Table 4 for the definition and the calculation of R l through R5, SARl through SAR5 as well as AR, ASAR, and the t-statistics (in
bold).

4.52

Table 10
Return Performance for Portfolios Based on Growth
Consistency in Sales (SG)

CHG
2.60
2.16 2.11
1.81 1.73
1.29 1.04 -1.16 -0.89 -1.00 2.18
1.46
Panel B: Consistent Growth Portfolios Ranked bv the Prior Two Year Consistencv in SG
Year 1
Year 2
Year 3
Year 4
Year 5
Average
Portfolio
R1 SARl R2 SAR2 R3 SAR3 R4 SAR4 R5 SARS AR
ASAR
CLG
:

,

CHG
CLG-

CGPl
2.13
1.62 0.60
0.24 -0.12 -0.28 -0.20 -0.38 0.19
0.04
1.44
0.59
Panel C: Consistent Growth Portfolios Ranked bv the Prior Four Year Consistencv in SG
Year 2
Year 3
Year 4
Year 5
Average
Year 1
Portfolio
R1 SARl R2 ' S A M R3 SAR3 : R4 SAR4 R5 SARS . AR
ASAR
CLG
CHG
CLGCHG
CGP4CGPl

2.35

1.92

0.30

-0.06

0.27

0.04

0.16

0.01

-0.08

-0.35

1.35

ieturn performance reported In t h ~ table
s
IS for cons~stentgrowth portfol~osformed based on consistency In SG (See Table 3 for
portfolio construction procedures). All portfolios are held without rebalancing for the next five years. Annual returns, R1 through R5
and size-adjusted abnormal returns, SARI through SARS are calculated for each post-formation year (years 1 through 5). As well,
average annual returns (AR) and average size-adjusted abnormal returns (ASAR) over the test period are computed for years 1
through 5. The annual returns are calculated as the geometric average monthly returns for five 12 month periods after portfolio
formation date. SAR is computed as the annual raw returns on a firm's stock less the average size-decile returns to which a firm
belongs. The CLG-CHG in Panels A through C refers to the return gap between CLG and CHG portfolios. The return differential
between the CLG-CHG portfolios and benchmark portfolios, i.e., CGP2-CGP1 and CGP4-CGPl, for each estimation interval are
shown in the last rows of Panel B and Panel C. Returns are calculated each year and averaged over the sample period and the timeseries variation is used to compute the t-statistics using the Fama-MacBeth (1973) method. The t-statistics are reported in bold

1

Table 11
Return Performance for Portfolios Based on Growth
Consistency in Operating Earnings (OEG)
Panel A: Consistent Growth Portfolios Ranked bv the Prior One Year Consistencv in OEG
Year 1
Year 2
Year 3
Year 4
Year 5
Average
Portfolio
R1 SARl R2 SAR2 R3 SAR3 R4 SAR4 R5 SARS AR
ASAR

Panel B: Consistent Growth Portfolios Ranked bv the Prior Two Year Consistencv in OEG
Year 1
Year 2
Year3
Year 4
Year 5
Average
Portfolio
R1 . SARl
R2 - SAR2 R3 SAR3 R4 SAR4 R5 SARS AR
ASAR
'

.

,

CGPl
0.86
0.70
1.44
1.37 0.50
0.35 0.09 -0.19
1.32
1.03 2.51
Panel C: Consistent Growth Portfolios Ranked bv the Prior Four Year Consistencv in OEG

Return performance reported in this table is for consistent growth portfolios formed based on consistency in OEG (See Table 3 for
portfolio construction procedures). These portfolios are held without rebalancing for the ensuing five years. See Table 10 for the
definition and the calculation of R l through R5, SARl through SAR5 as well as AR, ASAR, and the t-statistics (in bold). CLG-CHG
and CGP2-CGPI and CGP4-CGPI are defined in Table 10.

2.08

Table 12
Return Performance for Portfolios Based on Growth Consistency in
Earnings before Extraordinary Items (EBG)
Panel A: Consistent Growth Portfolios Ranked bv the Prior One Year Consistencv in EBG

CHG
-3.54 -3.79 2.82
2.72
1.54
1.26 0.90
0.79
1.82
1.61 1.45
0.91
Panel B: Consistent Growth Portfolios Ranked bv the Prior Two Year Consistencv in EBG
Year 1
Year 2
Year3
.
Year4
Year 5
!
Average
Portfolio
R1 SARl R2 S A W . R3 j SAR3 ' R4 S A R 4 , R5 SARS AR
ASAR
:

CLG-

5.06
-1.01

3.50
-1.50

3.95
5.96

:

,

-1.09
5.43

3.87
4.56

-0.40
3.81

4.56
1.87

0.87
1.17

4.41
4.85

0.27 15.35
4.07 3.25

Panel C: Consistent Growth Portfolios Ranked bv the Prior Four Year Consistencv in EBG

portfolio construction procedures). These portfolios are held without rebalancing for the ensuing five years. See Table 10 for the
definition and the calculation of R1 through R5, SARI through SARS as well as AR, ASAR, and the t-statistics (in bold). CLGCHG and CGP2-CGPI and CGP4-CGPl are defined in Table 10.

1.88
2.59

1

Table 13
Return Performance for Portfolios Based on Growth Consistency in
Cash Flow (CFG) as Defined in the Financial Literature
Panel A: Consistent Growth Portfolios Ranked bv the Prior One Year Consistencv in CFG

Panel B: Consistent Growth Portfolios Ranked bv the Prior Two Year Consistencv in CFG
Year 4
Portfolio
CLG
CHG
CLGCHG
CGP2CGPl

Return performance reported in this table is for consistent growth portfolios formed based on consistency in CFG (See Table 3 for
portfolio construction procedures). These portfolios are held without rebalancing for the ensuing five years. See Table 10 for the
definition and the calculation of R l through R5, SARl through SAR5 as well as AR, ASAR, and the t-statistics (in bold). CLG-CHG
and CGP2-CGPI and CGP4-CGPI are defined in Table 10.

Table 14
Return Performance for Portfolios Based on Growth Consistency in
Cash Flow (ACFG) as Defined in the Accounting Literature

I

Panel A: Consistent Growth Portfolios Ranked by the Prior One Year Consistency in ACFG
Year 1
Year 2
Year 3
Year 4
Year 5
Average

1 CHG

Q

R1

SARl

R2

-2.70

-3.03

3.74

SAR2

3.58

R3

1.50

SAR3

,

1.50

R4

0.58

SAR4

0.55

R5

1.37

SAR5 ARA ASAR

1.30

1.84

Return performance reported in this table is for consistent growth portfolios formed based on consistency in ACFG (See Table 3 for
portfolio construction procedures). These portfolios are held without rebalancing for the ensuing five years. See Table 10 for the
definition and the calculation of RI through R5, SARI through SAR5 as well as AR, ASAR, and the t-statistics (in bold). CLG-CHG
and CGP2-CGPI and CGP4-CGP I are defined in Table 10.

1.41

1

Table 15
Return Performance for Portfolios Based on
Consistency in Stock Returns (PRET)

Panel B: Consistent Growth Portfolios Ranked bv the Prior Two Year Consistencv in PRET
Year 1
Year 2
Year 3
Portfolio
CLG
CHG
CLGCHG
CGPZCGPl

Return performance reported in this table is for consistent growth portfolios formed based on consistency in PRET (See Table 3 for
portfolio construction procedures). These portfolios are held without rebalancing for the ensuing five years. See Table 10 for the
definition and the calculation of R l through R5, SARI through SARS as well as AR, ASAR, and the t-statistics (in bold). CLG-CHG
and CGP2-CGPI and CGP4-CGPI are defined in Table 10.

Table 16
Regression Results for Portfolios Based on Growth
Rates in Sales (SG)
Panel A: Parameter Estimates Based on the Prior One Year SG
Regression
Parameter Estimates
Models
Int.
SG
Beta
B/M

0.072
-0.052
4.10
-3.42
Model 2
0.022
-0.054
0.012
0.044
0.81
-3.69
0.36
1.28
Model 3
0.029
-0.053
0.0 19
0.023
1.02
-3.81
0.62
0.63
Panel B: Parameter Estimates Based on the Prior Three Year SG
Regression
Parameter Estimates
Models
Int.
SG
Beta
B N

Model 1

0.1 12
-0.034
4.40
-2.22
Model 2
0.035
-0.040
0.050
0.041
1.09
-2.57
1.56
0.94
Model 3
0.03 1
-0.043
0.052
0.020
0.94
-2.51
1.79
0.49
Panel C: Parameter Estimates Based on the Prior Five Year SG
Regression
Parameter Estimates
B N
Models
Int.
SG
Beta
Model 1

Model 1
Model 2
Model 3

0.083
3.49
-0.016
-0.48
-0.020
-0.60

0.007
-0.32
-0.001
-0.04
-0.001
-0.03

0.076
2.80
0.078
2.87

0.042
1.29
0.036
1.12

Size

-0.090
-5.71
-0.073
-3.43
-0.060
-2.97

Size

-0.126
-5.92
-0.109
-4.84
-0.094
-3.60

Size

-0.109
-5.1 1
-0.090
-3.34
-0.079
-2.39

SARl

-0.0 19
-0.72

SARl

-0.026
-0.93

SARl

-0.02
-0.93

At the end of each post-formation year, the following three cross-sectional regressions, in which the slze-adjusted
abnormal return (SAR) for each post-formation year (year 1 through year 5) 1s the dependent varlable, are estimated
Model 1 SAR,, = Po+P,0,,+P4SizeJ pJr
Model 2 SAR,, = Po +PIOJt+p2BetaJ,-l+P3B/MJ,., +P4SizeJ + p,,
Model 3 SAR,, = ~o+PIO,,
+P2Beta,,.l +P,B/MJ,.I +P4S~ze,,.l+ PsSAR,l+ pJT
SAR,,
,I'

Beta,,.,

= the

size-adjusted abnormal return for firm j in each of the post-formation year, where r varies from one to
five years after the portfolio is formed.
= the geometric mean of growth rates in past performance measures, i.e., SG, OEG, EBG, CFG, ACFG, and
PRET, for various estimation horizons, ranging from one to five years prior to portfolio formation date t. 0 is
sorted into scaled deciles, ranging from 0 (for the lowest decile) to 1 (for the highest decile).
= Market beta for firm j. It is calculated using monthly stock returns over the prior 60 months (with a
minimum of 36 months). Each year, Beta is sorted into scaled deciles, ranging from 0 (for the lowest decile)
to 1 (for the highest decile).
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Table 16 (continued)
BIM,,.,
Size, ,.,

SAR,,

= the book-to-market ratio for firm j. Both book value and market value are measured at the end of the fiscal
year T-1 Each year, BIM is sorted into scaled deciles, ranging from 0 (for the lowest decile) to 1 (for the
highest decile).
= the market value of equity capital in million at the year-end T-I. Each year, Size is sorted into scaled
deciles, ranging from 0 (for the lowest decile) to 1 (for the highest decile). Although SAR is the dependent
variable in these regressions, SIZE is included in the regressions to avoid biased coefficient estimates on 0
(e.g., Foster et al. [1984], Bernard [1987], Ali et al. [2003], and Desai et al. [2004]).
= the size-adjusted abnormal return for firm j in the first post-formation year.
The average coefficients and t-statistics (in bold) reported in this table are based on annual
regressions for the second post-formation year over the sample period using the Fama-MacBeth (1973)
procedures. The decision to report the parameter estimates for two-year-ahead after portfolio formation is
based on the similarity between regression estimates across all holding horizons.

Table 17
Regression Results for Portfolios Based on Growth
Rates in Operating Earnings (OEG)
Panel A: Parameter Estimates Based on the Prior One Year OEG
Regression
Parameter Estimates
B/M
Sue
Models
Int.
OEG
Beta

0.092
-0.075
-0.082
3.64
-3.07
-2.72
Model 2
-0.013
-0.073
0.045
0.070
-0.060
-0.48
-3.03
1.18
2.57
-2.34
Model 3
-0.052
-0.056
0.05 1
0.042
-0.040
-0.18
-2.35
1.59
1.02
-1.53
Panel B: Parameter Estimates Based on the Prior Three Year OEG
Regression
Parameter Estimates
Models
Int.
OEG
Beta
B N
Size

SARl

Model 1

0.109
-0.065
-0.089
4.74
-2.42
-3.33
Model 2
-0.006
-0.063
0.063
0.050
-0.08 1
-0.20
-2.56
1.99
1.34
-3.38
Model 3
-0.001
-0.065
0.062
0.03 1
-0.049
-0.03
-2.65
2.27
0.80
-2.18
Panel C: Parameter Estimates Based on the Prior Five Year OEG
Regression
Parameter Estimates
Models
Int.
OEG
Beta
B N
Sue

-0.039
1.26

SARl

Model 1

Model 1
Model 2
Model 3

0.1 13
5.64
-0.0 16
-0.74
-0.018
-0.67

-0.077
-2.06
-0.070
-2.30
-0.074
-2.40

0.074
2.58
0.075
2.43

0.067
1.54
0.052
1.30

-0.093
-2.13
-0.068
-2.28
-0.038
-1.22

-0.062
-2.26

SARl

-0.060
-2.35

The regression results reported in this table are for portfolios based on OEG. See Table 16 for regression models,
definition and calculation of regression coefficients, and t-statistics (in bold).
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Table 18
Regression Results for Portfolios Based on Growth Rates in Earnings
before Extraordinary Items (EBG)
Panel A: Parameter Estimates Based on the Prior One Year EBG
Regression
Parameter Estimates
B/M
Size
Models
Int.
EBG
Beta

SARl

Model 1

0.078
-0.069
4.08
-3.44
Model 2
-0.024
-0.070
0.043
0.078
-0.05 1
-0.77
-3.38
1.07
2.46
2.32
Model 3
-0.025
-0.064
0.043
0.042
-0.018
-0.73
-3.69
1.20
1.34
-0.98
Panel B: Parameter Estimates Based on the Prior Three Year EBG
Regression
Parameter Estimates
Models
Int.
EBG
Beta
BIM
Size

SARl

Model 1

0.101
4.57
Model 2
-0.023
-0.86
Model 3
-0.020
-0.070
Panel C: Parameter Estimates Based on the Prior Five Year EBG
Regression
Parameter Estimates
Models
Int.
EBG
Beta
B/M
Size
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3

0.079
4.50
-0.002
-0.07
-0.002
-0.06

-0.059
-2.12
-0.057
-2.39
-0.058
-2.35

0.030
0.90
0.025
0.70

0.034
0.89
0.040
0.95

-0.043
-1.88
-0.024
-0.90
-0.009
-0.28

SARl

-0.040
-1.65

The regresslon results presented In t h ~ table
s
are for portfol~osbased on EBG See Table 16 for regression models,
defin~t~on
and calculation of regresslon coefficients, and t-statistics (In bold).

Table 19
Regression Results for Portfolios Based on Growth Rates in Cash Flow
(CFG) as Defined in the Finance Literature
Panel A: Parameter Estimates Based on the Prior One Year CFG
Parameter Estimates
Regression
B/M
Size
Models
Int.
CFG
Beta
Model 1
0.094
-0.066
4.61
-3.20
Model 2
-0.010
-0.070
0.068
0.072
-0.076
-0.40
-3.47
1.96
2.24
-3.00
Model 3
-0.005
-0.050
0.058
0.068
-0.057
-0.19
-2.45
1.87
1.SO
-2.33
Panel B: Parameter Estimates Based on the Prior Three Year CFG
Regression
Parameter Estimates
B/M
Size
Models
Int.
CFG
Beta
0.127
-0.082
-0.099
6.04
-3.58
-4.56
Model 2
0.030
-0.082
0.064
0.042
-0.085
1.06
-3.95
1.67
1.21
-3.83
Model 3
0.026
-0.082
0.058
0.024
-0.057
0.86
-3.84
1.73
0.66
-2.52
Panel C: Parameter Estimates Based on the Prior Five Year CFG

SARl

-0.041
-1.64

SARl

Model 1

Regression
Models
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3

Int.
0.125
4.32
0.007
0.22
0.003
0.08

CFG
-0.076
-2.15
-0.072
-2.38
-0.074
-2.36

Parameter Estimates
Beta
B/M

0.069
1.77
0.063
1.79

0.062
1.57
0.057
1.27

Size
-0.093
-3.42
-0.075
-2.89
-0.053
-2.00

-0.048
-2.27

SARl

-0.045
-1.55

The regression results presented In thls table are for portfolios based on CFG See Table 16 for regresslon models,
defin~t~on
and calculat~onof regresslon coefficients, and t-statistics ( ~ bold).
n

Table 20
Regression Results for Portfolios Based on Growth Rates in Cash Flow
(ACFG) as Defined in the Accounting Literature

I

Panel A: Parameter Estimates Based on the Prior One Year ACFG
Regression
Parameter Estimates
Models
Int.
ACFG
Beta
B/M
Sue

0.1 13
-0.080
-0 124
4.69
-3.86
-3.36
Model 2
0.015
-0.082
0.087
0.074
0.102
0.53
-3.99
1.75
2.95
2.85
Model 3
0.025
-0.065
0.087
0.028
0.068
0.69
-3.12
1.59
0.69
2.15
Panel B: Parameter Estimates Based on the Prior Three Year ACFG
Regression
Parameter Estimates
Models
Int.
ACFG
Beta
B/M
Sue

SARl

Model 1

1
I

-0.040
-1.42

1

SARl

Model 1

0.151
-0.089
-0.109
5.93
-4.60
-3.98
Model 2
0.046
-0.090
0.120
0.047
-0.102
1.49
-4.73
1.84
1.27
-4.04
Model 3
0.039
-0.089
0.062
0.028
-0.080
1.16
-4.71
1.18
0.69
-2.79
Panel C: Parameter Estimates Based on the Prior Five Year ACFG
Regression
Parameter Estimates
Models
Int.
ACFG
Beta
B/M
Sue
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3

0.142
4.07
0.022
0.59
0.017
0.37

-0.084
-2.31
-0.075
-2.70
-0.075
-2.56

0.066
2.58
0.074
2.53

0.057
1.07
0.032
0.61

-0.098
-3.69
-0.097
-3.76
-0.095
-2.74

-0.049
-2.05

1

SARl

-0.046
-1.55

The regression
results presented in this table are for portfolios based on ACFG. See Table 16 for regression models,
definition and calculation of regression coefficients, and t-statistics (in bold).
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Table 21
Regression Results for Portfolios Based on Stock Returns (PRET)
Panel A: Parameter Estimates Based on the Prior One Year PRET
Regression
Parameter Estimates
B/M
Sue
Models
Int.
PRET
Beta

SARl

Model 1

0.135
-0.107
-0.082
4.22
-4.72
-4.14
Model 2
0.127
-0.121
0.003
-0.0 13
-0.075
3.23
-5.63
0.09
-0.38
-3.02
Model 3
0.126
-0.110
0.017
-0.043
-0.075
3.01
-5.09
0.49
-0.98
-2.68
Panel B: Parameter Estimates Based on the Prior Three Year PRET
Regression
Parameter Estimates
B/M
Size
Models
Int.
PRET
Beta

-0.032
-1.18

SARl

Model 1

0.148
-0.082
3.80
-3.60
Model 2
0.1 12
-0.100
0.027
2.97
-4.19
0.66
Model 3
0.117
-0.123
0.039
3.18
-4.57
1.05
Panel C: Parameter Estimates Based on the Prior Five Year PRET
Regression
Parameter Estimates
Models
Int.
PRET
Beta
B/M
Sue
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3

0.161
6.02
0.067
0.94
0.077
1.OS

-0.106
-4.25
-0.101
-5.07
-0.1 14
-5.35

0.078
1.55
0.082
1.69

-0.024
-0.53
-0.033
-1.69

-0.072
-2.73
-0.066
-1.88
-0.050
-1.27

SARl

-0.054
-2.29

The regresslon results presented In this table are for portfol~osbased on PRET See Table 16 for regression models,
defin~t~on
and calculat~onof regresslon coefficients, and t-stat~st~cs
(In bold)
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